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The base of research 
1 Introduction 
 
The Yom Kippur War, like many other Israeli wars, is in line with Israel’s previous conflicts. 
Because of its complexity and its extensive antecedents and aftermath, it is highly 
recommendable to study in order to analyze its causes and results. In the region itself, this war 
marks the beginning of the end of the Israeli social collective concept and helped all sides to 
accept the political reality and facts on the ground.  
 
Afterwards, Egypt, Jordan and Israel reached out to form a real peace agreement, and the 
global impact of the Yom Kippur War was visible by the Egypt's shift a Soviet stronghold to 
an American ally. The oil embargo that resulted from the Yom Kippur War helped the USA 
economy and pushed Europe towards further unification under the charter of the EC. All in 
all, the economy learned through this particular conflict to deal with sudden scarcity of 
resources by initiating proper regulations that strengthened international organizations and 
scientific efforts to search for alternative energy solutions.  
 
This conflict is the perfect example of how a small region’s ideologies, policies and views are 
able to endanger the whole world. Today, we are able to see the changes in both politics and 
societies occurring from the Six Days War through the peace-treaties that was singed with 
Israel.  
 
It is essential to investigate this extraordinary time by asking how the Yom Kippur War 
changed Israel’s defense doctrine and focusing especially on the Israeli policies that had to be 
reexamined after this surprise-attack.  
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2 Review 
 
On October 6th 1973, the Syrian and the Egyptian army launched a surprise attack against 
Israel. Egypt re-conquered 15 km on the east bank of the Suez in order to end Israel’s “No 
peace, no war” policy. Syria attacked Israel on the Golan Heights. This war took place on a 
larger scale than the public ever realized. At the end, more countries than just Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, Jordan and Israel were involved and supported by the USA and the Soviet Union. 
Additionally, Sudanese, Moroccan, Libyan, Algerian, Palestinian, Pakistani and Tunisian 
soldiers were recruited and financed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There were even soldiers 
from Cuba and Uganda fighting against Israel.1 The Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal 
and broke through the Bar-Lev Line (in 1971, Israel had spent $ 500 million fortifying its 
positions on the Suez Canal, creating a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks named 
after the Israeli General Chaim Bar Lev). The Syrian troops attacked the Golan Heights and 
advanced from the plateau in the direction of the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias. They were 
stopped some miles Tiberias on 8 October. The strategic Israeli point on Mount Hermon was 
seized by Syrian helicopter-borne commandos. As Israeli was deeply worried about the Syrian 
threat because of its proximity to Jewish towns and villages, Israeli Defense Minister Dayan 
ordered the deployment of nuclear missiles if Syria crossed the international boundary2. Israel 
faced a major disadvantage in the first days of the war due to the holy Jewish fasting day of 
Yom Kippur (the holiest day in the Jewish calendar). Most of the soldiers were at home, and 
the Israeli troops that were guarding the borders were outnumbered 9 to 1 by the advancing 
foreign armies. Israeli forces struck back on October 8th, turning the tables for the IDF (Israeli 
Defense Force) to their advantage. The IDF contained 415.000 troops, 1.500 tanks, 3.000 
armed carriers, 945 heavy artilleries, 561 airplanes, 84 helicopters and 38 warships. The 
Egyptians and Syrians originally had a much larger army, but were surprised by their own 
quick advance during the first days.  
 
 
1  See: Perez, 1988, pages 377–37. 
 
2 See: Ma’oz, 1995, page 130. 
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First they considered a small-scale operation in order to conquer the occupied territories as a 
tool to reopen negotiations after the international diplomatic quietness concerning UN 
Resolution 242 (Israel refused the request of the UN intermediary Gunar Jarring3 to withdraw 
to the borderlines of June 5th, 1967) and also due to internal political pressure from Egyptian 
and Syrian citizens. The Egyptian force had 800.000 troops, but only 280.000 were mobilized. 
Additionally, it contained 2.060 tanks, 2.400 armed carriers, 1.120 artillery units, 568 combat 
airplanes, 161 helicopters and 104 warships.4 The Syrian army employed around 60.000 
troops from their total of 150.000 and sent 1.400 tanks, 850 armed carriers, 600 heavy 
artillery, 350 airplanes, 36 helicopters and 21 warships to the battlefront. Iraq, as one of the 
forces allied with Egypt and Syria, sent 60.000 soldiers, 700 tanks, 500 armed carriers, 200 
artillery units and 73 airplanes. The confrontation ended on October 26th and left high 
casualties on both sides: 2.656 killed and 7.250 wounded Israelis, 400 IDF tanks were 
destroyed, 600 damaged and 102 downed IDF-airplanes. The Arab Armies lost 8.528 soldiers, 
19.540 troops were hurt and 2.250 tanks and 432 combat planes were destroyed.5 As a result 
of the Six Days War, Egypt received their weapon technology from the Soviet Union, 
especially MIG-21s, SA-2, 3, 6 and 7, Surface-to-air missiles (SAM), RPG-7s, T-55 and T-62 
tanks and, finally, the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missiles. Additionally, with help from 
Soviet military experts, Egypt was well prepared for the next conflict, but not enough. During 
the combat operation in the Sinai, Egypt feared to leave the missile (SAM) anti aircraft 
umbrella and originally conquered only a small strip of 15 kilometers on the other side of the 
Canal.  
 
 
 
3 Gunar Jarring (October 10th, 1907 in Brunnby – May 29th, 2002) worked after his career at Lund University 
as a Turkologist for the Swedish Foreign Ministry in Ankara and later on as a Diplomat in Teheran, Addis 
Abeba, Baghdad and India during the forties and fifties. After that period he was appointed as the Swedish 
ambassador in the UN, USA and USSR during the sixties. After the Six Days War he became the UN General-
Secretary for the Middle East peace process in the so-called “Jarring Mission” in order to bring the UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 in reality until the Yom Kippur War broke out. 
4 See. The Military Balance 1974-1975, pages 32-33. 
 
5 See: Rabinovich, 2004, page 496-497. 
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Asad6 urged Sadat7 to advance further, and that became a big disaster for the Egyptian army. 
In the days before, Israel had heavy losses especially of their planes by the Egyptian anti-
aircraft missiles. They shot down almost every IDF plane that crossed the Suez Canal, which 
caused a shock in the Israeli military ranks, because they had depended on their air superiority 
after their experience during the Six Days War and the War of Attrition8. The second 
stronghold of the Israeli force, their tanks, also faced new Russian weapon technology: the 
man-portable anti tank rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and the Sagger missiles. One man in 
every Egyptian platoon carried such a weapon. The Bar Lev Line was mainly built by sand 
and was broken surprisingly quickly by huge water cannons imported from West Germany. 
At the end of the war only one fortress, codename Budapest, remained under Israeli control. 
All others were captured by the Egyptian army. The Israeli counterattack against the Egyptian 
army at Hizajon on October 8th under General Shmuel Gonen was such a great disaster for the 
IDF that the Egyptian counterattack could be only stopped by the 143 armed forces under 
General Ariel Sharon9, who was activated from his retirement. General Elazar10 replaced the 
unsuccessful Gonen, who also came back from retirement, together with General Haim-Bar 
Lev, and defended the massive attack of the Egyptian soldiers under the guidance of Saad El 
Shazly11 and Ahmad Ismail Ali12 on October 14th. 
6 Hafez al Asad was the longest serving President of Syria. He ordered the Yom Kippur Surprise Attack on 
Israel in 1973 together with the Egyptian President Sadat. Asad stabilized and organized his power with the 
Baath Party in Syria after a long time of chaos. This regime kept its power after Hafez’s death under the 
guidance of his son, President Bashar al Asad. 
7 Muhammad Anwar al Sadat (December 25th, 1918 – October 6th, 1981) was the third President of Egypt 
from September 28th, 1970 until he was assassinated on October 6th, 1981 as the result of the peace treaty with 
Israel.  
 
8 The War of Attrition was a limited conflict between Egypt and Israel between 1967 and 1970. At its peak in 
1969, Egypt artillery started bombarding the Israeli Sinai-front, hoping to damage or stop the construction of the 
Bar Lev Line and to force Israel to make territorial concessions. Israel IDF planes stroke back. The conflict 
ended in August 1970. 
 
9 Ariel Sharon (February 27th, 1928) became famous as an Israeli general in the Yom Kippur War. During the 
1982 Lebanon War, he became “indirectly” responsible as the Minister of Defense (investigated through the 
Kahan Commission) for the Sabra and Shatila Massacre in Beirut and since that time he has been seen as a war 
criminal by the Arab world. He became the leader of the Likud (1999) and Prime Minister from March 2001 
until April 2006. His political career as the head of his new founded Party Kadima ended when he suffered a 
stroke. 
10 David Elazar (1925 – 1976) was the Chief of Staff of the IDF during the Yom Kippur War. He had to resign 
after the results of the Agranat Commission. 
11 Saad El Shazly was the Egyptian Chief of Staff during the Yom Kippur War. After his criticism of the Camp 
David results, he was dismissed from his new career as ambassador to Portugal and went into exile in Algeria. 
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From that time on (October 15th), Israel changed its tactics (Operation Stouthearted Men) and 
shifted its power from air- and tank-battles to simple infantry and infiltrated the SAM 
positions. Against the order of the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan13, Ariel Sharon’s troops 
crossed the Suez Canal (north of the Bitter Lake) and General Avraham Adam’s troops went 
south in order to isolate the Egyptian 3rd Army. The battles around the Chinese Farm (an 
irrigated area east of the Canal and north of the crossing point) were the hardest fought of the 
entire war. More troops crossed Sharon’s bridgehead on October 16th to the 17th, and started to 
blow up the SAM stations and the anti-tank defenses. On October 19th, Israel built further 
bridgeheads. From that point on, the Israeli airplanes and tanks could operate effectively. 
Egypt was in an urgent need for a cease-fire after Israeli troops had closed the ring around the 
city of Suez and advanced up to 100 kilometers from Cairo. However, for Israel the battle 
against Syria was because of the proximate of its home-front the highest priority. In the Sinai 
and the Negev, Israel had time to prepare. On the other hand, the Golan Heights were only a 
distance of some kilometers from Israel’s center. Furthermore, during the first three days there 
were only 188 Israeli tanks facing 2000 Syrian tanks. Israel immediately lost its stronghold in 
the Hermon Mountains, Jabal al Shaikh. Israel sent every incoming reservist directly to the 
battle scene, often without equipment or armed vehicles.  
The Syrians, coming from their breakthrough in Nafah, faced heavy individual Israeli tank 
resistance at the Tapline Road, which runs diagonally across the Golan. After four days of 
fighting, the Syrian troops met the 7th Armored Reserve Brigade commanded by Yanush Ben 
Gal. Israel managed to build a defense line in Nafah. The fighting next to the Sea of Gallilee 
was a success for the Syrian armies. They advanced until the Barak Brigade was able to stop 
them, though sustaining heavy casualties. On October 8th, the reserve force arrived and 
pushed Syrian troops back so as to prevent Israel’s cities from being shelled. On October 10th, 
the Syrian army withdrew behind the pre-war border (purple) line.  
 
 
 
12 Ahmad Ismail Ali (October14th, 1917 –December 26th, 1974) was the Chief Commander of Egypt's army and 
Minister of War during the Yom Kippur War. He planned the surprise attack across the Suez Canal on October 
6th, 1973 that had started the Yom Kippur War. 
13 Moshe Dayan (20th May, 1915 –16th October, 1981) was the fourth Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Force 
(IDF) during the Suez Crises and Minister of Defence during the Yom Kippur War. The world public has a 
diverse opinion about his role in history: Some experienced him as a fighting symbol of the State of Israel, for 
others he was a war criminal and a thief of Arabic archaeological culture. Fact is that at the end of his political 
career, he was willing to give Israel’s neighbours a lot of concessions for peace. 
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On October 11th, Golda Meir14 gave the order to cross the purple line in order to gain territory 
as a bargaining chip for the peace negotiation after the war. Until October 14th, the IDF 
advanced to a distance of 60 kilometer from Damascus and started to shell the outskirts of the 
capital with heavy artillery. From that point on, Iraqi and Jordanian troops intervened and 
stopped Israel’s further advance. The Russian navy moved its ships to Crete, out of the battle 
zone, and faced the American fleet. In the middle of October there were around 70 Russian 
warships in the Mediterranean. Some of the battleships were sent to Cyprus to guide merchant 
vessels on their way to Syria. At the end of the war, the total number of Soviet ships in the 
Mediterranean Sea reached 96, including 29 surface combatants and 23 submarines.15 That 
was a world record for Russia, and this number of ships was designed to impress the Arabs 
and show them that the USSR was ready to take action if necessary.  
On October 22nd, the Israelis dug themselves in at Bashan and recaptured the key tactical 
position of the whole area, the outpost on the Mount Hebron. On October 23rd, Syria, Iraq and 
Jordan prepared a major counterattack. The Soviet Union replaced most of the lost Syrian 
tanks, but one day before the battle started, the UN, Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire 
and Asad was left in a dilemma. He had to call off the offensive and sent the Iraqi troops back 
home. On that day, the situation became even more dangerous for Asad, due to the continued 
advances of the Israelis that cut off the Egyptian 3rd Army. Egyptians leaders called for an 
implementation of the cease-fire through the use of foreign troops, while Brezhnev16 
proposed a second resolution at the UN. Finally, the Superpowers came to an agreement and 
Resolution 338 was born. Still, Israel pushed further and controlled the Suez Canal through 
October 24th. In Cairo, the Egyptian civilians became confused and panic by Israel’s latest 
successes. Sadat sent messages to Washington and Moscow demanding they send troops to 
stop Israel.  
 
14 Golda Meir (born as Golda Mabovitz: May 3rd, 1898 –December 8th, 1978) was one of the founders of the 
State of Israel. During the time of Prime Minster David Ben Gurion she was appointed as Minister of Labour 
and Foreign Minister. She was the first Prime Minister in the world and the public described her as the “Iron 
Lady” caused by her un-discussable position for “Eretz Israel”. She guided Israel through the Yom Kippur War. 
 
15 See: Golan, in: Israeli Affairs, Vol. 6, 1999-2000, page 127 and 136. 
16 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (December 19th, 1907 –November 10th, 1982) was the head of the Soviet Union from 
1964 to 1982 and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 until 1982. He was 
twice Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1960 to 1964 and from 1977 to 1982. 
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After the war, the US Nuclear Alert was viewed as a response to the Russian weapon-
shipments and especially through the report that Soviet nuclear materials for Scud missiles 
had been delivered to Alexandria and Soviet troops were being transported to the 
Mediterranean from October 24th to 25th.  
The truth was that news of nuclear materials being shipped through the Bosporus had reached 
the “White House” on the morning of October 25th; hours after the DefCon3 Alert had been 
called. The Nuclear Alert was not activated by the Russian airlift or the Russian fleet. The 
alarm was a result of this letter from Brezhnev to Nixon: 
"Let us together, the USSR and the United States, urgently dispatch Soviet and 
American military contingents to Egypt, to ensure the implementation of the decision 
of the Security Council of October 22nd and 23rd concerning the cessation of fire and 
of all military activities and also of our understanding with you and guarantee of the 
implementation of the decision of the Security Council. It is necessary to adhere 
without delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in 
this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of 
taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of 
Israel." 17
The Politburo met on October 25th. They were surprised by this strong American reaction and 
immediately rejected a military confrontation. Brezhnev decided to ignore the American alert 
because the cease-fire was holding. The alert helped the Soviets to display their effort to 
fulfill the commitments to the Arabs. Nevertheless, Egypt turned fully to the USA after the 
war. From that time on, the USSR was out of the game and had not a choice but to accept the 
USA as the dominant power in the Middle East. When the cease fire came into place, Israel 
had lost territory on the east side of the Suez Canal to Egypt, but gained territory west of the 
Canal and on the Golan Heights. Additionally, Israel trapped the 3rd Egyptian Army and 
gained the best possible position for the upcoming negotiations.  
17  Golan, in: Israeli Affairs, Vol. 6, 1999-2000, page 146. 
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3 UN-Resolutions 242 and 338 
 
3.1  Resolution 242 
Resolution 242 was implemented by the United Nation on November 22nd, 1967 as the result 
of the Six Days War. It is the theoretical base upon which the Arab countries built their attack 
on Yom Kippur. Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories is the highest priority in this 
resolution and will be the dominant document for Middle East policy until it is resolved. The 
problems of the Palestinian people were not a major topic because it was already discussed in 
Resolution 181 in 1947. In 242 they are mentioned as “refugees”: 
 
The Security Council 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,  
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for 
a just and lasting peace, in which every State in the area can live in security, 
 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United 
Nations have undertaken a commitment of act in accord with Article 2 of the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
(I) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict.18 
(II) Termination of all claims or state of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or act of force. 
 
18 Note by Prof. Dr. Fine on April 15th 2008: “The French version said: […] all the territories …”. 
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2. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to 
the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order 
to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement 
in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of 
the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.19 
 
3.2 Resolution 338 
Resolution 338 was the Yom Kippur War cease-fire agreement passed by the UN on October 
22nd, 1973. The Arab states pushed to include requests from Resolution 242 in the new 
document, but it was more an alibi then a condition. Israel’s neighbors were further away 
from the 242 Resolution implementation than ever before. Syria was the last member of the 
war to agree to Resolution 338, which it did on October 24th.  
The Security Council 
1.  Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption 
of this decision, in the position they occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall 
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing 
a just and durable peace in the Middle East. 
 
19 See: Mottinger, 1988, pages 17-19 and 80–81. 
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4 Egypt’s and Syria’s policy background: Its secrets, changes and aims 
On April 14th, 1974, Sadat introduced his “October papers” to the ASU20 and passed it 
through a referendum: It would signify a revolutionary change in Egyptian policy: 
1. Economic development 
2. Egypt’s preparations for the year 2000 
3. Liberating its economy inside and outside in order to secure the invested capital and 
development projects 
4. Creating social change through scientific-based planning 
5. Consolidation and reorganization of the public sectors in order to give Sadat the 
capacity to lead development 
6. Social development and human formation 
7. Movement into the era of science and technology 
8. Cultural progress based on science and faith 
9. A liberal and free society 
10. A secure society in which present and future civilians enjoy social protections21 
 
 
 
 
 
20 The Arab Socialistic Union (ASU) is the sole political party sanctioned under the Egypt constitution. 
Although Article 55 of the law permits Egyptian citizen to form societies within limits of the law, the scope of 
their political activities is practically nonexistent, because only the ASU is entitled to act politically. A politically 
active group must keep its activities within the prescribed limits and the organizational structure of the party that 
is said to represent the “alliance” of the peasants, workers, soldiers, intelligentia and national capitalists; the 
peasants and workers are entitled to at least 50 % of the membership in all the organization of the ASU. In 1971, 
the ASU was reported to have approximately 6 million members (from: Record of the Arab World, July-
December 1971). 
 
21 See: Klöwer, Köln 1976, page 8 (translated from German to English by the Author). 
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It seems strange that this political change was already planned by Sadat before the Yom 
Kippur War. After Nasser’s death on September 28th, 1970, his successor, Vice-president 
Sadat, had this new policy in mind; it was a complete change from Nasser's policies since 
1952. Nasser’s ideas were socialistic, but Sadat’s policies moved in the direction of 
capitalism. He endeavored to follow more Egyptian rather than pan-Arab goals, such as 
attention towards Palestine, and focus more on solving Egypt’s social and economic 
problems.22 Concerning Israel`s foreign policy of “no peace no war”, Sadat's intention was to 
break it and to achieve a peace settlement with Israel in 1972, but his actions were not taken 
seriously neither by Jerusalem, the US, or the international community. Sadat became 
President as a result of a compromise between the powerful groups in Egyptian politics, and 
to their surprise, he did not change as much as they expected and what they expected. The last 
major crisis, staged to remove the obstacles of his power, was Egypt's contract with the Syrian 
President Asad and the Lebanese government for promotion of Arabic republics, which Sadat 
signed without informing the Executive Committee. It raised the question of whether the 
President is allowed to make foreign policy decisions without permission of other authorities. 
ASU rejected the contract, and Sadat, after having secured support from the army, arrested its 
influential members, especially his competitor, Prime Minister Ali Sabri23. The official 
reason: Conspiring against the President and the security of the state. 
From that point on, Sadat’s was liberated to set his ideas into reality. The Yom Kippur War, 
caused by the stubborn behavior of the Israelis, gave Sadat the opportunity to prove his 
strength in front of his people and to recover Egypt’s dignity after the disaster of the Six Days 
War. His acquired support by the people resulted in the remarkable speed towards peace with 
Israel in 1978.24  
 
 
22 See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 69. 
 
23 Ali Sabri (1920-1991) was Prime Minister from Egypt from 1962-1965. He was imprisoned by Sadat as a 
result of his new policy (Corrective Revolution). 
 
24 Nasser, Hamid:” Ursachen der Außenpolitischen Neuorientierung Ägyptens unter Sadat”, Dissertation an der 
Universität Hamburg, 1980,160-172. 
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The path to power for Syria`s President Asad was similar to that of Sadat’s. Both had to 
overcome their strongest internal political competitors before they could create their own 
policy concepts. In Asad's case, General Jadid25 was Asad’s main obstacle to power.  
He overtook him through a “mini-coup” during Israel’s raid against the Fath bases in al-
Hammam and Maysalun on February 25th, 1969, by sending army units to control the key 
buildings in Damascus, including Ba’th Party offices and Syrian media centers.  
“And, although he was still unable to depose Jadid, Asad continued his efforts to seize 
power in Damascus, largely using Syria’s policy towards Israel as his motive (or 
pretext). Thus, for example, in March 1969 he forced the Ba’th emergency regional 
convention to adopt certain resolutions which were compatible with his strategy and 
contrary to Jadid’s policy: those renewed efforts should be made to establish an 
Eastern command (with Iraq and Jordan) to co-ordinate between the Syrian front and 
other Arab fronts and to seek union with progressive Arab states-all in order to 
facilitate the struggle against Israel.”26  
After Egypt`s President Abd al-Nasser died in September 1970, Jadid lost the strongest 
supporter of his efforts, which provoked Asad to finally depose him. In May 1971, General 
Asad became President, and he appointed 4 other generals: Mustafa Tlas, Abdul Rhaman 
Khleifawi, Naji Jamil and Abudl Ghani Ibrahim to key positions within the Syrian 
administration. 
Hence, there were two major differences between Egypt and Syria in their foreign policy 
since 1967: First, Syria’s program against Israel was Terror (they formed a pro Syrian-
Palestinian-Terror-Organization called “Lightning”) that had a strict, in this case, Russian-
influenced purpose. 
"In the 1970s terrorism, whether backed directly or indirectly by the Soviet Union or 
independently initiated, appeared to have become an indispensable tactical and 
25 General Salah Jadid (1926-1993) was the head of the Syrian government from 1966 until 1970. ‘During his 
office he aligned with the Soviet Union. As a result of the Six Days War and the unsuccessful support of the PLO 
against the Jordan army he was arrested by Asad after a coup and remained in prison until his end of life 23 
years later. 
 
26 Ma’oz Moshe, 1995, page 119. 
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strategic tool in the Soviet struggles for power and Influence within and among 
nations."27
The aims the Soviet Union hoped to achieve by terrorism were: 
1) Influencing developments in neighboring countries. 
2) Regaining irredentist territories in the Soviet orbit. 
3) Helping to create new states in which it will have considerable influence as a result 
of its support of those nations’ claims for self-determination. 
4) Weakening the political, economic and military infrastructure of anti-Soviet 
alliances such as NATO. 
5) Initiating proxy operations in distant geographical locations where direct 
organized conventional military activities are logistically impracticable. 
6) Stirring up trouble for the United States. 
7) Waging a "secret war" against individuals considered by the Kremlin as "mortal 
enemies" of Communism and the Soviet Union. 28
With Syrian encouragement and direction, various guerrilla groups carried out (particularly 
during the late 1960’s) many military operations inside Israel (and Jordan), the West Bank, 
Gaza and the Golan - including the territories of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. From mid-1969 
on, Syrian troops also periodically attacked Israeli targets on the Golan. This highly 
developed USSR technique of “Terror as Deception” that was taught to its allies finds its 
example in the second but greatest difference between Syria and Egypt, the rejection of 
Resolution 242. Syria rejected a peaceful settlement with Israel in which Israel would even 
agree to withdraw from the occupied territories.  
 
Suddenly, in March 1972, Asad changed his mind and agreed to the resolution. In retrospect, 
we know he did this in order to plan secretly for another war:  
27 Ganbor, in: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1997. 
28 Ganbor, in: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 1997. 
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“Yet, as it were, neither Moshe Dayan nor Golda Meir nor other Israeli leader could 
or would perceive the change in Syrian strategy towards Israel under Asad’s 
leadership (nor the significant shift in Egypt’s policy under Sadat), namely: Asad’s 
inclination to accept the principle of political settlement (UN Resolution 242) and, 
particularly and simultaneously, his strong determination and systematic preparations 
for waging another war against Israel.29
 
At the moment Asad came to power, he followed this well-known, simple policy: 
1. Recovery of Syrian territory presently occupied by Israel (Golan Heights) 
2. Maintenance of the current regime and, associated with this goal, development of 
popular support for the regime and government 
3. Resolution of the Palestinian issue 
4. Economic development of Syria and, in support of that policy, the attraction of private 
and foreign government investment 
5. Maintenance and improvement of relations with Arab countries 
6. Improvement of economic, political, and social relations with the West 
7. Acceptable termination of the conflict with Israel 
 
He continued to prepare Syria’s army for the Yom Kippur War with the help of the Soviets. 
By keeping the anti-Jewish, anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist indoctrination and propaganda campaign 
in place, he prepared Syria’s public for another war. Further, he introduced democratic 
reforms, started a new economic policy connected to Syrian values and opened the legislative 
and public arenas to other parties besides the Ba’ath, in order to get popular support for his 
regime. The connection to the Soviets was a major element of Syrian policy against Israel. 
Syria was dependent on the Soviets for weapons, training and support of Asad’s regime.  
Because Syria followed Moscow’s policy, Israel was sure that Asad would not go to war 
without Soviet backing.30
29 Ma’oz, 1995, pages 116 and 117. 
 
30 See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, pages 250-255. 
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At the same time, Asad established a new cooperation with Egypt and other powerful Arab 
organizations. Israeli strategy placed a premium upon breaking this cooperation. All these 
actions by the Arabs were taken under the premises of the Palestinian problem and the return 
of the occupied territories, and these nations found that the only way to maintain unity and 
support among one another was to threaten war with Israel.31 Cooperation with Egypt had one 
very interesting and secret aspect: A calculation by Sadat that was hidden even from Asad 
during the Yom Kippur War. This decision influenced the outcome substantially:  
“Yet, while both Asad and Sadat were engaged in deceiving Israel, Sadat, according 
to Seale, was deceiving Asad and the Soviets by leading him to believe that Egypt’s 
offensive would be wider in scope than he ever intended, namely: Sadat passes in the 
first stage before regrouping for the re-conquest of the whole Sinai Peninsula, 
whereas in fact he planned only to cross the Suez Canal and capture the narrow strip 
of land on the eastern bank.”  
There was also another fact that Sadat took into consideration: The SAM umbrella reached 
over a narrow strip on the other side, but the moment Egyptian armies left that protection, 
they would immediately be the victims of Israel’s combat planes. But the original plan agreed 
to by Sadat and Asad was that Sadat should advance deep into the Sinai in order to put more 
pressure onto the IDF so that the Syrian army had more “air” to breathe. This situation 
reflected the divergence of the war aims of each of the Arab leaders.  
“Whereas Sadat went into a limited war in order to shatter the status quo and 
generate American pressure on Israel to give up the entire Sinai, Asad envisaged the 
capture of the entire Golan (and Sinai) and subsequently pressure on Israel to give up 
the occupied Palestinian territories.”32  
Finally, Asad (with full Soviet help) pressured Sadat to leave the umbrella and to advance 
further into the Sinai, but it was too late. Israel reacted successfully and pushed Syria`s troops 
away from the shore of Lake Tiberias and the River Jordan and out of the Golan by October 
10th and advanced inside Syrian territory. Only on October 13th, after Israeli forces were half 
way to Damascus, did Sadat order the attack into the Sinai. Asad was deeply disappointed, 
because until then he was not aware of Sadat’s duplicity.  
31 See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 141. 
 
32 Ma’oz, 1995, page 128. 
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Sadat accepted a cease-fire (Resolution 338) with Israel on October 16th, without consulting 
Asad, who now felt betrayed and humiliated by Sadat. Syria continued fighting through 
October 22nd, at which time the strategic Mount Hermon war re-conquered by the Israelis. On 
October 23rd, Syria accepted the Resolution but spelled out its own understanding that it 
called for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.33
 
33 See: Ma’oz, 1995, pages 130 and 131. 
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5  Israel’s political environment after 1967 
Some aspects of the Israeli political regime arrangements were established along the lines of 
the consociation models in Austria, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. It was a multi-party 
system with ideological bases. A broadly based parliamentary coalition would be important 
for ruling if the biggest Party did not reach more than 50%. From 1949 until 1977, Mapai was 
the strongest party, but they never succeeded in winning more than the 60 seats needed in the 
Knesset to gain the majority rule. This was also a problem from 1969 to 1974.34 Mapai (today 
Labor) was a social democratic party that already had its own institutions like sports clubs and 
youth groups before the state of Israel had been founded. It was more than a political party. It 
carried the Kibbutz movement and the Workers Union (Histadrut). It took care of the 
immigrants, providing houses and work for them. It supported the poorest members of 
society. Mapai had strong connections to the army and to the religious groups. Its charismatic 
leaders were identified with the social democratic ideology. It was a sovereign movement for 
a whole decade, and it was the political guide through the whole epoch from 1948 until 1977. 
Towards the end of its long leadership, Mapai lost its connection to the regular people and 
was not able to renew or even question its old structures. Its leaders could not keep their 
voters` trust, and soon, the feeling of equality was gone and suspicion for oligarchic 
tendencies of the small elite in Mapai and its growing arrogance arouse hatreds, especially 
among the younger generations. The party did not manage to instill its values and ideals to the 
younger generations, and it “needed” a surprise attack to enforce changes in Israeli society. 
The crisis began in 1969 when Golda Meir was looking for partners to build a coalition. She 
came suddenly to power in February 1969 at the age of 72 and faced new elections in 
October.  
That was two month after Nixon35 took office and Golda Meir had to offer only a parliament 
in stagnation. "Fringe parties have wound up holding the balance, with disproportionate 
influence inside successive Israeli Cabinet".36 No quick decisions could be taken.  
34 See: Peretz/Doron, 1997, pages 71. 
 
35 Richard Milhous Nixon (January 9th, 1913 –April 22nd, 1994) served as the President of the United States 
from 1969 to 1974 and was the only President who resigned from office, caused by the “Watergate” scandal. He 
was Vice President under Dwight D. Eisenhower two times. He kept the détente with the Soviet Union and 
China and ended the USA involvement in the Vietnam War. He was the US President during the Yom Kippur 
War. 
 
36  The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 27. 
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“On becoming prime minister, Golda Meir adopted the two principles that formed the 
bedrock of Israeli policy after 1967: no return to the prewar borders and no 
withdrawal without direct negotiation and peace treaties with the Arab states.”37
Her ministers were from the Labor Party, which was founded in January 1969 and soon split 
into factions. Mapam and Gahal (The Herut Movement) were prepared to withdraw from the 
occupied lands. But even in this matter some ministers did not agree on the details. The Labor 
Party had numerous debates concerning the future and the peace settlement with the Arabs, 
but never came to a conclusion. The National Religious Party claimed a historic right to the 
"Promised Land", which included the West Bank, while Gahal wanted Israeli sovereignty 
over the gains of 1967. Golda Meir's so called "Kitchen Cabinet“ would have fallen apart if 
Meir had insisted in any of these issues. As prime minister she had ultimate responsibility for 
defense policy. This responsibility was expressed constitutionally by the prime minister’s 
chairmanship of the cabinet’s defense committee. But during her premiership, this committee 
did not meet regularly. Its place was taken by an informal body that came to be known as 
‘Golda’s Kitchen’ because it met in her house. The regular participants in Golda’s kitchen 
were Israel Galilee, Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban, and Pinhas Sapir38 Nevertheless, 
even Meir’s attempt to hold the coalition together failed at the end. 
 
The lack of Israel governmental decisions concerning the peace process forced Egypt to begin 
the War of Attrition on July 20th, 1969. This War affected Israel’s nuclear policy:  
“The main advocates of the nuclear option were Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres. 
[…] Israel refused to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)39, America officials wanted 
to know whether Israel intended to produce nuclear weapons. […] Rabin explained 
that Israel would not be the first to “test” such weapons or to reveal their existence 
publicly. This formula satisfied the Americans.”40
37 Shalim, 2000, page 285. 
 
38 See: Shalim, 2000, page 287. 
 
39 In 1968, 140 States signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is the promise to refrain from developing and 
purchasing nuclear arms. In return they would get full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purpose. 
 
40  Shalim, 2000, pages 297 and 198. 
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Another reason of not pushing for peace had more to do with economics than with politics: 
Jews in the Diaspora were sending an average of $ 1.2 billion per year and other forms of 
Investments between 1967 and 1972, whereas during the four years before the Six Days War, 
Diaspora Jews had sent only $ 400 million in investments. Between the wars, investments 
doubled and industry boomed. The economic benefits seen from these investments had 
persuaded the government not to be in a hurry to make peace. In addition to this new 
economic power, Israel was finding that the 1967 war had given the country a new sense of 
invincibility. Ariel Sharon said: "We can conquer in one week the area from Khartoum to 
Baghdad and Algeria."41
Finally there were advantages to keeping the occupied territories like oil from Sinai and cheap 
Arab labor for construction and agriculture in Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. (The 
Israeli Government held a second Cabinet meeting two weeks after the 67 War on June 21st 
1967, were it decided that Israel would be ready to give back the Golan and Sinai for 
peace).42 Fortune seemed to be on Israel’s side to the extent that even American Jewry began 
to focus on their own needs in their community because of the feeling that Israel had been 
saved. The liberal circle in America that always gave Israel "backup" thought that Israel no 
longer needed any care while the opposition, the Republicans, who were never really in favor 
of Israel, considered the time after the 1967 war to be an opportunity to block Communist 
expansion in the Middle East.  
After visiting Nixon in 1973, Golda Meir proclaimed that Israel had a friend in the "White 
House". This caused many liberals even turned their back on the Israeli government. Behind 
the scenes, the Egyptian and Syrian armies prepared for war. In 1974, after the Yom Kippur 
War, Israel experienced a strong political and moral defeat. However, the public still 
supported the traditional party, Mapai, mainly because of its former leader, Ben Gurion, who 
was identified as the person most responsible for the establishment of the state. This party 
also took care of the immigrants, for whom voting for another party was considered an act of 
betrayal to Israel. Also, the economic growth after the "War of Independence" was attributed 
to the Mapai leaders. But the voters started to move to other parties after the Yom Kippur 
41 The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 27. 
42            Note by Prof. Dr. Fine on April 15th 2008 
24 
 
                                                
War. Likud gained 39 of 120 seats of the Parliament in 1974. This was the first time that a 
party threatened Mapai.43  
To borrow Aristotle’s example, the leaders on the ship are responsible for safe navigation. 
The surprise attack of the Yom Kippur War caused such an impact in the citizens’ mind that 
the effect was visible on the results in the voting of 1977, and Likud came to power: 
"From the outset Israel's physical existence was challenged, and the leading role 
which Labor’s leader played in the successful defense of the nation has been one of 
the most important bases of their authority".44  
"…the shock of the surprise attack on Yom Kippur 1973 and the protest movements 
that followed had shown that the taken-for-granted assumption of Labor's leadership 
of the nation and its defense establishment was seriously called into question on a 
significant scale."45
As we will see during the next chapters, Mapai was the victim of its own organization 
structures. Its strong connection to the army eventually made them blind to the coming 
danger. 
 
43 See: Peretz/Doron, 1997, page 70. 
44 Peri, 1983, page 19.  
 
45  Myron, 1990, pages 260-281.  
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Influences on Israel’s foreign policy 
 
6 Israel’s foreign policy  
Israel’s policy was based on three different general influences before and especially after the 
Yom Kippur War. The first and highest priority was the Long-Run Survival of Israel as a 
Jewish state surrounded by Arab enemies. This includes questions of security objectives and 
territorial settlements that are mostly connected to military goals. Without a doubt, this 
priority was focused on and connected to the foreign policy of Israel’s neighbors, the Arab 
states and Arab populations (“Population Dispersal Policy”) within Israel’s sphere of 
influence.  
The second largest influence on the Israeli policy changes was the international community, 
including the UN, EU, the African states and particularly the USA. This factor became 
dominant with the rising interest of the United States in oil supply.  
The third and latest influence that caught Israel’s representatives by surprise was the change 
in Israeli public opinion after the Yom Kippur War. The different Israeli parties played a 
marginal role on its policy influence and on the defense doctrine. In fact, they tended to be 
oppositional factors concerning the path to negotiations and political settlements. The political 
result of the change in public opinion was the rise of Likud, which came into power after the 
1977 election, and the appearance of different opinion groups.  
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6.1  The highest priority: The Long-Run Survival of Israel 
 
The first priority of all Israeli policies is the Long-Run Survival of Israel. It is a focus that will 
not change as long Israel exists as a Jewish state.  
One of the major problems facing the Israeli leadership for some years, and 
particularly since the October War46, has been the formulation of a definitive 
statement that includes the specific goals to be achieved in settlement negotiations 
with the Arab states.47  
The Arab states considered themselves to be nations that had nothing to do with the Shoa but 
nevertheless had to deal with its result. For the Jews, the Shoa is a catastrophe equal to the 
biblical ones and is one of the reasons for creating the State of Israel.48 Of course, this 
country was established officially by the UN as a compromise between the two 
“Superpowers”, the USSR and the USA, but for the “Nation-building” process, in the minds 
of the western and Jewish population, the Shoa was the proof of the importance of a Jewish 
democratic state in Palestine. It was the “lowest common denominator” for all the Jews in the 
world, even ones who were not victims of the Nazi persecution. The builders of Israel saw 
and still see it as their responsibility to protect all the dead and living Jews around the world. 
Diaspora Jews were “brought home” to “Eretz Israel” in several huge actions organized by 
the government based on the “Law of return,” which makes Israel different from all other 
countries. This law gives every Jew, no matter where he was born, the right to receive Israeli 
citizenship. 
This new idea of a Jewish democratic state implicates that, in order to be Jewish-democratic, 
the majority of this collective must be Jewish citizens. In order to reach this goal, the 
Palestinian refugees, from the Independence War on, were not allowed to come back and 
Israeli Arabs have had to face substantial disadvantages in their daily lives. On the other hand, 
the state of Israel encourages immigration of Diaspora Jews. This, of course, caused a 
gathering of many different kinds of Jews from all kinds of Jewish traditions and cultures and 
from all nations.  
46 Note by the author: The Yom Kippur War is also called the October War, the Ramadan War or the  
    4th Israeli War. 
 
47 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 209. 
 
48 See: Zimmermann, 1997, page 263. 
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All of them used the “Law of Return” to come to Israel. Here is David Ben Gurion to the 
Knesset about the "Law of Return": 
 
"The State of Israel differs from the other states both with regard to the factors 
involved in its establishment and to the aims of its existence. It was established merely 
two years ago, but its roots are grounded in the far past and it is nourished by ancient 
springs. Its authority is limited to the area in which its residents dwell, but its gates 
are open to every Jew wherever he may be. The State of Israel is not a Jewish state 
merely because the majority of its inhabitants are Jews. It is a state for all the Jews 
wherever they may be and for every Jew who so desires."49
 
Ben Gurion defines the collective of the State of Israel as everyone who desires to be a Jew. 
This Jew must have a deep connection to his roots in the Land of Israel.  
But what has united all Jews from these different cultures, directions and philosophies? The 
"Declaration of Independence" helps us to answer this question: 
"The Nazi holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in Europe, was another clear 
demonstration of the urgency of the re-establishment Eretz-Israel of the Jewish State, 
which would open the gates of the homelands wide to every Jew and confer upon the 
Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations."50
The Shoa was undoubtedly the unification point for all Jews. The "Nürnberger Race Laws" 
and the Concentration Camps did not distinguish between Ashkenazi, Sefardi, Reform, 
Conservative or Orthodox Jews. The disillusion of the former assimilated Jews in Western 
Europe and the disappointments of the Russian Jews in the Soviet Union after World War II 
united all Jewry under the nationalistic ideology of the Zionism movement. This Zionist 
movement is seen by the Arab states as a racist development against the Arab population, and 
Israel is viewed as a state without legitimacy.  
49 “The Debate on the law of return and law of citizenship”, July 3rd, 1950, pages 2035-2037.  
 
50 “Declaration of Independence”, Friday, Mai 14th, 1948- Erev Shabbat 5th year 5708.  
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This denial of the right to existence is the source of the principle objective of Israeli policy of 
the long-run existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish state:  
Against this complex background the single objective of Israel’s foreign policy can be 
stated in quite concrete terms. It is to mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for the 
protection and preservation of Israel as it is. This is no different, of course, form the 
basic objective of the foreign policy of any other State, and although to that extent 
commonplace it nevertheless well bears repetition as it is so often overlooked... the 
State’s continued existence and its continued security and prosperity are equally the 
survival of the Jewish people. Such preoccupation with national survival – spiritual 
and physical – engendered by a sense of historic mission would impress its stamp on 
Israel’s foreign relations under all circumstances. It is even more prominent as things 
are when Israel found itself from the moment of its inception beset by powerful 
enemies bent on its complete physical destruction.51
This statement guides us directly to the second priority that had an influence on the Israeli 
foreign policy. 
51 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 205. 
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6.2  The second pillar: Mobilizing all resources of diplomacy  
The statement that “[Israel] is to mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for the protection 
and preservation of Israel as it is” includes Europe as much as African states and the 
“Superpowers” before the Yom Kippur War (Israel tried unsuccessfully to join a kind of 
western pact between 1948 and 1956). Particularly, America`s Security Guarantees and its 
willingness to underwrite a settlement with the Arab states gave Israel a strong partner. 
However, it also gave Israel a higher degree of independence that had its effect on the 
changing policy toward the Arab countries, which made Israel look more and more like a US 
marionette after the Six Days War. Defense Minister Peres:  
Israel cannot escape the fact that it is likely to be called upon to pay a price, so that 
other forces, including those friendly to it, can maintain their influence and guarantee 
their legitimate interest in the Middle East. There is nothing wrong with that, and 
there is no point in ignoring a demand of this sort….52
Israel needed US weapons and financial support and that led to a dilemma on several 
occasions. “Since the October War, Israeli thinking and public opinion have shifted toward 
the more balanced view that long-run American support is vital, and that any policy must 
have at least U.S. backing.”53
From that point on it was clear that the influence of the US foreign policy on Israel was 
enormous.  
“Of all Middle East actors, both regional and external, the interests and attitudes of 
the United States probably have been most greatly altered by the events and 
developments of the early 1970’s. Until then, U.S. national interests in the Middle East 
could be viewed as marginal. These interests were the following: denial of control 
over Middle East resources to hostile powers; preservation of the assured destruction 
capability of the regional element of the U.S. strategic forces; assured supply of 
Middle East natural resources important to American industry and military;  
52 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner 1977, page 204. 
 
53 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 203. 
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assured supply to U.S. allies of resources adequate to maintain their economic and 
military strength; realization of the benefits resulting from U.S. commercial 
investments and operations in the Middle East; maintenances of U.S. credibility by 
fully meeting American commitments; maintenance of over flight and transit rights. It 
should be noted that support of Israel, or support of the existence of Israel, is not 
included among traditional U.S. interests.”54  
This policy changed substantially since the Six Days War and particularly in 1973. Not only 
had the USSR and the U.S. become the most influential powers in the region after Britain and 
France moved out, but the international arena had started to focus on the Middle East 
question, particularly the question of the return of the occupied territories, the existence of 
Israel and the faith of the Palestinian people.  
 
But no cause was stronger than the need for oil:  
“Finally, the oil picture for the United States has changed. In 1972-73 the continuing 
growth in energy demand and the decline in domestic petroleum production left a 
shortfall of significant proportions. Moreover, whereas Venezuelan and Canadian 
crude had been imported to meet this shortfall in the past, the dimensions of the 
requirement meant that only Middle Eastern oil could fill the demand.”55
To reach this target, the U.S. had to avoid a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, 
achieve a peaceful settlement between the Arabs and Israelis and maintain Israel’s security. 
They knew that if they succeeded, they would have access to oil and to the Middle East 
markets. Additionally, the U.S. could prove that a relation with them was of greater advantage 
than one with the Soviet Union. The U.S. policy directly influenced Israeli policy took place 
under Nixon in 1969 as a result of the Six Days War:  
“… the role of U.S.-Soviet agreement and the limits of Soviet support; the parameters 
of settlement, principally some mix that would fall within Resolution 242-Israeli 
withdrawal from occupied Arab territory, the recognition of an establishment of 
54 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 9. 
55 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 10. 
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security of Israel, and an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem; stability of 
the government of the parties to the conflict; the role of public opinion in the Middle 
East, particularly in Israel; Congressional and U.S. public opinion; the need for a 
Palestinian spokesman; the appropriate role for the United States.”.56
 
Meir's decision not to call in the reservists and not to strike first was highly political. At noon, 
Elazar got permission to fully mobilize, after Keating had sent an urgent message to Nixon 
and Kissinger 57and received a positive reply. 
The surprise of the Yom Kippur War forced the U.S. to set a new agenda for foreign policy 
towards the Middle East and Israel:  
“For the United States a diplomatic role in the Middle East became not a preference 
but a matter of vital interest: Because of our historical and moral commitment to the 
survival and security of Israel; Because of our important concerns in the Arab world, 
an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world’s largest oil 
reserves; Because perpetual crisis in the Middle East jeopardizes the world’s hopes 
for economic recovery, threatening the well-being or the industrial nations and the 
hopes of the developing world; and because tension in the Middle East increasing the 
prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk.”58. 
Israel submitted to the new U.S. policy after the shock of the Yom Kippur War. The reasons 
were that a stronger connection to the U.S. would perhaps prevent another disaster and, 
because the Arab armies had updated their weapons systems and fighting capacities, Israel 
needed more sophisticated weapons in order to keep its military superpower status.  
56 See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 12 and 18. 
57 Henry Alfred Kissinger (May 27th, 1923) was born in Germany and had to leave to America because of his 
Jewish heritage. He became one of the most important diplomats in modern history: First as National Security 
Advisor and Secretary of State under President Nixon. He kept this position during the period of President Ford. 
Kissinger established the policy of détente, “opened” China and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973for 
helping to end the Vietnam War. Until today Kissinger is a controversy person because of his policy toward 
South America and East Timor: He kept friendly diplomatic relationships to military dictators and supported 
them in order to strengthen anti-communist states. 
58 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 18. 
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Unfortunately, no move was made to solve the root of the problem: Israel rejected a 
withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the West Bank out of security reasons and missed the 
opportunity to come to an overall settlement with the Arabs:  
Israel's problem in reaching a solution lay within the internal policy-making process 
and its inability to provide decisive leadership behind which the nation can unite.59  
The appearance of the different individual communities after the Yom Kippur War made it 
even worse. 
 
 
59 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 217. 
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6.3  The new influence: Israeli public opinion 
Due to the Parliamentary System, Israel is in the most uncomfortable position when it comes 
to negotiations and settlements in comparison to its Arab competitors. The missing dominant 
leader combined by the different opinions of the parties leads to deadlocks, such as during the 
period between 1967 and 1973. Additionally, we must examine the changes in public opinion 
after the Yom Kippur War.  
“The real significance of public opinion lies in the limits it places on policy 
alternatives. It is obvious that a final settlement cannot be implemented unless it has 
the wide support of the Israeli public, and the ability of the government to mobilize 
support for official policy may prove to be as important as the influence of public 
opinion on policy making.”60  
Changes in public opinion had large and remarkable impacts on the foreign policy of Israel 
after the Yom Kippur War. They were both unpredictable and surprising to all parties.  
 
 
60 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 194. 
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Changes in Israel’s defense doctrine 
7 Israel’s Defense Doctrine and its misperception 
 
The Yom Kippur War as a surprise attack was a good example of a war of perception and 
deception: 
Perception will be defined as the discerning of detail, relating to political, military or 
other intentions of a certain fact, but only the knowledge about its existence. The act of 
perception is dependent on values, anticipation and drives, experiences and cultural 
and operational environment in which the actor is immersed.61  
 
Within a couple of days after the Six Days War, an exceptional euphoria arose beneath the 
Israeli population. The amazing victory washed away the moaning about the casualties, and 
the Israelis were flooding into the occupied territories, especially into East-Jerusalem. They 
explored the West Bank and the Sinai in ecstasy. On mass, the feeling of unity, pride and 
arrogance against the Arab population rose, and even new religious feelings were experienced 
by people that had not been touched by such things before. At the same time they were 
astonished by the prospering agriculture of the occupied Arab people, which was contrary to 
their knowledge from schoolbooks that said that Arabs were not able to take care of their 
infrastructure.  
This euphoria led to the attempt to drop the original “Land for Peace” policy from Ben 
Gurion and to annex Jerusalem and the West Bank. It became an inviting idea and Yigal Alon 
gave the order to draw a new borderline including the West bank and Gaza and introduce this 
to the Knesset.62 The public enthusiasm had an influence on the politicians and made them 
blind to the reality and was based on Israel’s earthshaking Victory, a result of the high quality 
of soldiers and weapon technology. On the day when the gates opened to East-Jerusalem, the 
Hebrew University on Mount Scopus invited Rabin for a celebration honoring him. He gave a 
speech, written by the high ranked Officer for education that included thoughts which were 
already accepted by the Israeli public.  
61  Heichal, in: Israeli Affairs, Vol. 6/1, 1999-2000.  
 
62 See: Segev, 2005, pages 506-513. 
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Rabin spoke about the exceptional status of the Israeli Army that was not less than the 
manifestation of the exceptional being of the Israeli people.  
He mentioned that the army did its part for many educational tasks (e.g., the education of new 
immigrants). He, Rabin, accepted the honor from the University as a sign of respect for the 
spiritual and moral superiority of the army at warfare.63 This new blind trust of the people to 
the army institution led to unreflective perceptions by army officers and a harsh change in the 
foreign policy.  
“And within four years of this apotheosis, Israel’s circumstances plummeted from 
euphoria to depression, from international prestige to diplomatic isolation, from 
economic boom to galloping inflation, from large-scale immigration to substantial 
emigration. The Yom Kippur War was the watershed. It destroyed the myth of Israel’s 
invincibility and eroded the nation’s self-confidence.”64  
All in all, the status of the army in Israeli society is of such importance that it must be 
explained at the next chapter in order to understand its influence on Israel’s foreign policy:  
63 See: Segev, 2005, pages 522-523. 
 
64 Sacher, 1987, page 4.  
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8 The status of Israel’s Army 
During its first twenty-five years, Israel had to survive four major wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 
and 1973), and the question of security constantly dominated political debates. Even before 
the establishment of a state, communities suffered from terror attacks. The army has always 
been an institution of trust and security that the citizens count on in life and death situations. 
In "The Republic", Plato states that our guardians should be warriors and philosophers: 
"Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, 
military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will 
not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out 
of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be a 
mathematician."65
Especially during the first period of the State of Israel, Ben Gurion held both positions: 
"Prime minister" and "Minister of Defense" between the ministries of Sharett and Lavon in 
1954.66 This combination of knowledge and force was an important factor in far-reaching 
political activities and effective short range activities. Ben Gurion gave the Israeli army a 
position that was much more than just a security institution. To the present, it is the melting 
pot for many immigrants from all over the world. At the moment a Diaspora Jew does "Alia" 
(meaning “going up” as an all-inclusive metaphor for a social and religious Jew by 
returning/immigrating to the Promised Land) under the "Law of Return", he/she is required to 
join the army and assimilate his/her language, culture, and open up to comrades that have 
different colors, habits and traditions. 
The required army service is 30 months for men and 20 months for women, at which point 
men stay as reserves until the age of 45. This reserve is crucial for Israel’s defense policy 
because, due to its small population, there must be a mobilization within 48 to 72 hours.  
 
 
65 Plato, page 11 
  
66 See: Brecher, 1974, page 181.  
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In 1967, this mobilization included around 275.000 men, which means that with 2.65 million 
inhabitants at the time, the whole nation served in the army and no production was done in the 
country. 67One of the main military policies existing through today is to hit the enemy hard 
and fast, because a long struggle (over two months) would lead to a collapse of the state. The 
question about a preemptive strike and the call for the reservists is one of the most discussed 
controversies about the Yom Kippur War because of the costs and the question of the shortest 
possible warfare with maximum results without losing support and legitimacy in world 
opinion. Another specialty of the Israeli army is its high standard of weaponry and trained 
units. Regular simulations and drills and the high level of education gives the Israeli soldier a 
much better position in the field than his Arab enemy. The average Israeli soldier is included 
in the decision-making, and because of their awareness that there is nowhere to run, losing is 
not an option. This makes the Israeli soldier a highly motivated and self responsible human 
resource with the highest battle capacity. As a result, Israel militarily won all its wars and its 
army achieved a halo from military glory. People are proud of their military units, and for 
them, their leaders are heroes. For most of the citizens, there is no question that the military 
elites are risking their lives for the good of the state and its Jewish people. Or, like Aristotle 
proclaims, “a political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere 
companionship”.68
Because of this strong social position of the army, taking part in the most important matters of 
the state, they have always had a tremendous influence on Israel’s politics. However, the 
position of the army elites was different before and after the collapse of Mapai. The state`s 
foreign policy also changed as a result of the party's end. During the rule of Mapai, Israel was 
a “Proporzdemokratie,” which meant that the leaders of the parties and blocs made decisions 
behind closed doors about how national resources should be spread in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality in order to avoid clashes between members of the various camps 
on the grassroots level that could endanger the whole government. Between 1956 and 1967, 
the military and bureaucratic elites became part of the elite political class that gained power, 
prestige and influence.69  
67 See: Krivinyi, in: Truppendienst, Zeitschrift für die Ausbildung im Bundesheer, 6. Jahrgang,  
               Nr. 1/1968, page 4. 
 
68 Aristotle, page 144.  
 
69 See: Sheffer, in: Israel Affairs, Vol. 6, 1999-2000. 
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These members of the elite cartel were expected to be loyal to their own camps. In Israel, this 
period was called the Yishuv era. Mapai leaders had a pre-eminent position in the entire elite 
cartel, and only their leaders had to face the hardest decisions for their country. At that time, 
those leaders were Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol and the Troika – Golda Meir, Zalman Aran and 
Pinhas Sapir. One of the major shifts happened between the Six Days War and the Yom 
Kippur War. The Yom Kippur War was even a result of that shift, which had an active 
influence on foreign policy and manifested because of a communication problem between the 
elites.70 To present, whether such high levels of military influence are good or bad and the 
impact on Israeli foreign policy is a huge discussion within Israel. In giving political power to 
the best man in the state, Israel is succeeding well: 
("... and so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect state wives 
and children are to be in common; and that all education and through pursuits of war 
and peace are also in common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors 
ought to be their king.")71, 
Out of a huge pot of human resource of soldiers, only some of the most charismatic and 
strongest at decision making processes achieve high positions in the army. A state that does 
not take leaders out of its institutions and place them into respected leadership positions 
cannot fulfill the whole range of governing perspectives and sometimes has problems 
recruiting enough staff to rule a government. This, by the way, was the problem of the Likud 
after the Mapai epoch, when it did not have such strong connections to the important 
institutions of the state. Mapai knew this game very well and finally failed in that matter 
before the Yom Kippur War, because of losing the balance of consultation by their own 
military advisors with the opinions of others.  
This particularly happened after the 1967 War, when the chief of the general staff and other 
army officers began participating in cabinet meetings. This situation became a „self-fulfilling 
prophecy": Soldiers bring about conflicts, because they are constantly preparing for war.  
 
 
 
 
70 See: Sheffer, in: Israel Affairs, Vol. 6, 1999-2000. 
 
71 Plato, page 27. 
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This danger does not rise in the Israeli army during times of crisis, but during times of peace. 
The reason is the so-called "pyramid hopping“, which expresses a common habit in Israeli 
politics of army leaders shifting into high political positions. This established practice gave 
retired high ranked officers the chance to change from the top of one pyramid to the top of the 
other. These officers had an enormous impact on the history of Israel.  
 
To present, more than 46 officers have joined the political elite and more than 16 of them 
became members of the government. Plato wrote: 
"… at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to 
hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way 
they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying 
whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm 
and flinch. And how long is this stage of their lives to last? Fifteen years, I answered; 
and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and 
have distinguished themselves in very action of their lives and in every branch of 
knowledge come at last to their consummation; the time has now arrived at which they 
must raise the eye of the soul to the universals light which lightens all things, and 
behold the absolute good, for that is the pattern according to which they are to order 
the State and the lives of Individuals, …).72
 
Hence there is an agreement between Plato and Israeli tradition when it comes to sending 
retired soldiers into politics,    
I see great risk in the tradition of “Pyramid Hopping”, as does Eva Etzioni-Halevy in her 
article, "The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel". The problem is that 
military elites attempt to preserve their system of advantage. Perhaps sub-consciously, they do 
everything (that means nothing) to avoid a situation of complete peace that would leave them 
useless and force them to a life far away from the political spotlight.  
 
72 Plato, page 25. 
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"Extrapolating from the present into the future, it may be added that, as the peace 
process unfolds, the military may become less important to the state's survival, and its 
command may feel that its pivotal position is Israeli society in under threat. Therefore, 
in order to prevent a threatened military elite from attempting to ensure its position by 
abusing its entry into the political sphere even more blatantly than it does now, a 
gradual progress toward civil/ military separation should now begin to be 
implemented, to thwart such a possible future scenario."73
 
Sometimes it seems that the state of Israel and its neighbors, including the Palestinian 
government, were afraid of peace, because after a successful agreement they would have had 
to deal with their inner social problems and every politician and every party would have had 
to find new positions of legitimacy. 
Between 1969 and 1974, the influence of the army on Israel’s political decisions grew 
enormously and reached a critical stage with regard to its effects upon diplomacy in the 
international political arena. As long as Ben Gurion was the head of the government, the army 
was not included in the meetings of the cabinet. Ben Gurion himself had been in charge of 
military decisions and was highly involved in Israeli intelligence. However, he maintained a 
dividing line between influence from the army and political decision-making. But when 
General Moshe Dayan became Minister of Defense, he took a different direction. He 
eliminated the dividing line between governmental and army responsibilities. Military officers 
came to the cabinet as frequently as the ministers themselves. In the final days before the Yom 
Kippur War began, there was a showdown of that highlighted the wrong kind of “after Six 
Days War policy” and the most frightening example of the failures of Israel Military 
Intelligence. In 1977, this specific period of time would force Israel to make huge change in 
its foreign policy and social awareness after the report of the Agranat investigation (I refer to 
this in a later chapter). 
 
 
73 See: Etzioni-Halevy, in: Armed Forces and Society, pages 401-417. 
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The most representative of all military failures involved the Director of the Intelligence, 
General Eli Zeira,74 as Israel got 11 strategic warnings for the upcoming war, in addition to 
the AMAN (=Agaf Ha Modi’in)75 reports in the shortest period of time, but Zeira was still 
sure that there would not be any attack76:  
 
1) Israel received the first concrete warning at the middle of September 1973. A Humint 
(human intelligence) source informed intelligence that Sadat and Asad were planning a war 
against Israel by the end of that year. AMAN did not react.  
2) AMAN itself recognized the signs of war in Syria at the beginning of September. Air 
photos showed the preparations, but AMAN interpreted these moves as a procedure for the 
coming meeting of Asad in Algeria or even Syrian concerns that Israel could initiate an 
attack. On September 23rd, the air photos showed that Syria's army was ready for attack.  
3) Israel received a warning from King Hussein of Jordan77 himself, when he met Golda Meir 
in Israel on September 25th. He gave the warning of a cooperating attack to Meir, but after 
having consulted her Minister of Defense, Dayan, as well as the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant 
General David Elazar, and Zeira, Meir went to Austria without any alert order.  
4) On September 28th, the warning came from Syrian officers that their troops had taken up 
combat positions for war.  
5) On September 29th, US intelligence warned Israel, and the CIA warned Meir and Dayan of 
a coming war.  
74 Eli Zeira was a Major General of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the director of the Israeli’s military 
intelligence (AMAN) during the Yom Kippur War. After this War he was found guilty by the Agranat 
Commission for unpreparedness of the Israeli troops for that surprise attack. As a result of that investigation 
Zeira resigned. 
75 AMAN (Directorate of Military Intelligence) was created in 1950. It is an independent service with 7,000 
personnel and takes care of the military intelligence.  
76 See: Bar.Joseph, in: Israel Affairs 6, 1, 1999, pages 14 - 18.  
77 Hussein Ibn Talal, King of Jordan (November 14th, 1935 – February 7th, 1999). He came on power in 1952 
after his father, King Talal. 
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6) On October 2nd, AMAN reported details about Syrian equipment. The Israeli analysts still 
believed that the risk of an independent Syrian action remained low.  
7) Israel got the first warning of Egypt's intention to go to war on September 30th from a 
Humint source. This warning caused a temporary rise in the state of alert of the Command in 
the north and of the Southern Command by Major General Gonen.  
8) In the following days, AMAN reported strong activities on the Egyptian border. On 
October 2nd, they discovered bridging gears, boats, trucks, cannons, regiments and platoons in 
increasing numbers. AMAN interpreted these observations as signs of an army exercise.  
9) The Israeli Mossad warned of war on October 2nd.  
10) One day earlier, an unidentified source had also warned of war.  
11) On the morning of October 6th, AMAN recognized the evacuation of Soviet advisers and 
their families from Egypt. This finally changed AMAN's conception that war was unlikely.  
 
The beginning Soviet exodus on October 5th was the reason why Golda Meir got permission 
from her cabinet to make a full-scale military call up if needed during the holy days. One of 
the reasons why Golda Meir reacted slowly on those masses of specific warnings was because 
of Zeira, who blocked from the information flow between the AMAN and Meir's cabinet. He 
even gave wrong information to Dayan, telling him that AMAN was using all its means of 
intelligence collection in the last hours. Zeira was creating an atmosphere that war was not 
immanent by not providing the cabinet with the complete information about these warnings.78  
He said about the Friday, October 5th meeting in retrospect, "We will never know whether the 
war would have broken out, if we had called the reserves.”79 This speech refers to the 
background of the final meeting in Meir's office with Dayan, Galili, Elazar, Haim Bar Lev 
and Shimon Peres. Elazar asked for calling the reservists. The idea was rejected due to the 
others because of the delicate question whether to disrupt the hallow calm of Yom Kippur by 
calling up the reservists.  
78 See: The Insight Team of the Sunday Times: "The Yom Kippur War" Andre Deutsche Limited, 
London, 1975, page 115. 
79 The Insight Team of the Sunday Times: "The Yom Kippur War" Andre Deutsche Limited, London, 
1975, page 117. 
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Meir said on Israeli television in November 16th, 1974 that, if her official advisors had 
proposed mobilization, she would have agreed at once. At that time, Dayan had had the power 
to do so. However, Zeira convinced him that war was of a low probability. On October 5th 
(Friday), Meir made the following decision: She gave the order to the Cabinet Secretary 
Michael Arnon to ensure contact with every Minister of the Cabinet during the holidays in 
order to call them in a case of emergency.  
At that time, General Ariel Sharon started to mobilize his reserve division by himself, as he 
was sure that the war would start within two days. The Southern commander, Major General 
Gorodish Gonen, stopped him. 
Zeira's reasoning and interpretations of the warnings contributed significantly to the decision 
not to mobilize the reserve army on Friday at noon.80 Golda Meir did not get all the important 
information and warnings on time. She trusted in the military institutions and officers. But 
even then, there were enough warnings and signs to have reason to react differently.  
She wrote in her memoirs81: "Of all the events upon which I have touched in this book, none 
is so hard for me to write about as the war of October, 1973, the Yom Kippur War." Once she 
had made already a decision for a partial mobilization in May 1973. At that time, everything 
on the Egyptian border looked like war. This mobilization cost eleven million dollars. This 
was one more reason why she hesitated to call the reservists again. Although Meir had a bad 
feeling about all the reinforcement of troops at the Syrian and Egyptian borders, the Israeli 
Intelligence calmed her down. They explained to her that the Syrians were afraid of an Israeli 
attack and the Egyptians were on maneuvers, like they always did around this time of the 
year. Almost everybody underestimated the Arab generals: 
"Following the ending of the War of Attrition in October 1970, the beginning of the cease-
fire, the death of Nasser, the civil war in Jordan and ultimately the apparent removal of the 
Soviet advisers by Sadat developed a feeling in the Israeli defense establishment that a 
considerable period of time would elapse before the Arabs would be ready for war, a feeling 
that was strengthened by a pervasive sense of satisfaction with the post-1967 status quo.”82
80 See: Bar-Joseph, in: Israel Affairs 6, 1999, page 28. 
81 Meir, 1975, page 420. 
 
82 See: Herzog, 1975, page 41. 
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Meir's dependence upon her military advisors and not her cabinet ministers was perhaps the 
main reason for her failure to adequately mobilize troops. 
Like Sharon, Air Force commander Major General Benjamin Peled had already prepared the 
Air Force for a preemptive strike himself when Elazar gave him finally the order on Friday, 
October 5th at 2 p.m. The next day, at 6 p.m., Elazar phoned Dayan to confirm the full 
mobilization and a preemptive air strike. Dayan refused to confirm and said that he needed an 
order from Golda Meir and that she was against taking those steps. However, Dayan phoned 
her, and at 6 a.m., he and Elazar went to Golda Meir. She vetoed both plans: "How many 
friends would we have left, if we did that!" She answered that if Israel struck first, the world 
would have assumed that they had started the war, which was a general assumption after the 
Six Days War. Meir forbade ordering the first strike and the full mobilization. Dayan gave the 
permission for a partial mobilization. This decision opened up the ammunition stores at 10 
a.m. Meir's final reason not to call the reservists was connected to the US foreign policy:  
“Following their preemptive strike in June 1967, Israeli leaders became sensitive to 
charges of ‘aggression’, at least until October 1973, when Prime Minister Meir 
rejected the suggestion of another preemptive strike, primarily because of a perceived 
inability to gain American and other worldwide support for Israel on such short 
notice.”83
Golda Meir was afraid to risk good relations with the U.S. government by making a wrong 
decision, like calling reservists too early. At that time, Kenneth Keating84 was the U.S. 
ambassador in Israel. Meir called him at 8 a.m. He warned her that if Israel struck first, the 
United States would feel unable to supply fresh equipment: "If Israel refrained from a 
preemptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the 
aggressors, then America would feel morally obliged to help."85 These events and decisions 
were the bases on which the social changes affected Israel's policies. 
83 Smith, 1973, page 18. 
 
84 Kenneth Barnard Keating (May 18th, 1900 – May 5th, 1975) was US Representative and Senator of New 
York. He was the US ambassador in Israel during the Yom Kippur War. 
85 The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 122. 
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9  The change in Israeli society 
The first change occurred during the 1967 War, when Israel occupied territory and many 
Israelis considered that to be an act of injustice. This part of the population remained unheard 
by the rest, who experienced the victory as the birth of a new superpower in this region. The 
following attempt to use land as a "bargaining chip" in the negotiation with the Arab 
countries, which would have meant “land for peace”, was not convincing and the Yom Kippur 
War forced Israelis wake up and face the reality. Under this reality, Mapai was blamed for the 
high losses of soldiers during this war, caused by failures of their leaders, and the connection 
to the young voters and to the new immigrants got lost. All these events led to the end of a 
unifying era, especially due to the commission that was established after the war in order to 
investigate and to determine the responsibility for the disaster. It was headed by Supreme 
Court Justice Shimon Agranat. That is the reason why it was called the Agranat Commission 
and its outcome forced the early end of Golda Meir’s cabinet and new elections in 1977. In 
April 1974, the commission reported about the Israeli unpreparedness for the Arab offensive, 
whose advanced warnings neither the military intelligence, the Sinai commanders, nor the 
Chief Of Staff reacted on.  
“Where the commission refused to speculate was in the murky area of Defense 
Minister Moshe Dayan’s personal responsibility for Israel’s early battlefield setbacks. 
On this point, however, public reaction was less equivalent. An explosion of outrage 
greeted the report. It appeared unconscionable that career officers were punished, 
while Dayan, the self-proclaimed architect of Israel’s military supremacy, was being 
absolved.”86
But there is also another important point that encouraged Israelis after the Yom Kippur War to 
demand individual influence on daily politics: The attraction of consummation. Influenced by 
Israeli affinity to the USA and its liberal democratic system, the Israeli population developed 
their individual personalities to adopt a new, egocentric lifestyle that was in conflict with the 
united era.  
One important step was the media's shift away from a national-militaristic dialogue towards a 
more universal, anti-militaristic one after the Yom Kippur War. American democracy is also 
based on the guidance of the public through the media.  
86 Sacher, 1987, page 1. 
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Mostly through television, the media became a Chippi (upper middle class, composed primly 
of secular, educated, broadminded people between the ages of 20 and 50 who have adopted a 
Western, bourgeois style of life, [i.e., capitalistic, hooked on work, intellectual, progressive 
thinkers]) stronghold, in order to install the liberal democratic religion. Edward Walker, the 
US Ambassador in Israel, complained about this style of recruiting American electoral 
strategists: 
"It is always dangerous when you start importing somebody else's political ways. The 
American system depends on the media … and I am not sure it is right for here. In 
Israel you don't necessarily have to rely solely on image, sound bites and so on, you 
can actually get out and talk to the people. Israel should develop its own approach to 
politics, bringing in obviously some of the things (tactics of the US campaign advisers) 
that are effective, but not being dominated by them."87  
However, the new system has worked out quite well in the Israeli public since the 
establishment of nonprofit organizations, which has split up society into hundreds of opinions 
or interests and embraces the rights of the individual.  
"Their activists formed 'common cause' coalitions to confront sexual harassment, gay 
and lesbian discrimination, gender issues, ethnic, religious and minority rights, 
regional peace initiatives, affirmative action, environmental justice, and even animal 
rights."88
Almog Oz wrote a good description of "democracy worship" in Israel: 
"It is rooted in equal rights, individual competition and private enterprise. This 
climate nurtures feminism and sensitivity, skepticism and criticism, social and self 
awareness, romantic love and interpersonal relations; It advocates the individual's 
right to privacy and longing for sophistication, his attention to outer appearance and 
his quest for diversity and style; it encourages people to learn as much as possible, 
seek the best in entertainment, preserve the environment and its resources, and 
constantly strive to improve their economic status."89
87 Harman, in: The Jerusalem Post, April 9th, 1999. 
 
88 Laskier, in: Israeli Studies 5.1. 
 
89 Oz, in: Israel Affairs 8.1. 
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The first reaction after the war was the rise of protest movements, which should not be 
misunderstood as peace movements. One such organization was Yisrael Shelanu (Our Israel). 
Headed by Motti Ashkenazi, his followers were educated middle class Ashkenazim. This 
movement was established by demobilized reservists from the front line, who expressed their 
feeling that the establishment was detached from the men and the people on the front. They 
demanded the resignation of the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and the introduction of a 
constitution in Israel. Their needs and their outcry for a change in the procedure of the system 
left a strong impact on the Israeli public. As Prime Minister Golda Meir and her Government 
resigned on April 11th, 1974, this organization disappeared.  
However, even though Yisrael Shelanu, and the other protest movements, soon 
vanished from the scene, the dissatisfaction which they had expressed and the general 
demands that they had raised remained. Furthermore, from an extra-parliamentary 
political-historical point of view, the protest movements broke the operative national 
consensus in an unprecedented manner, and created a negative peripheral consensus 
towards the center.90
Yisrael Shelanu had a common goal with “The Black Panther” movement: Closing the socio-
economic gaps within the Israeli society. However, their cooperation was unsuccessful. The 
Black Panthers were founded in 1970 by Jewish activists from Muslim countries origin 
following the “War of Attrition”. Many of them came from poor neighborhoods and had 
criminal records. This Black Panther organization expressed its unhappiness with the 
economic growth after the Six Days War. They could not take advantage of the economy and 
felt pressure from the new immigrants from the Soviet Union.  
On September 11th, 1973, they won 1,6 per cent in the Histadrut91 elections. They extracted 
voters from the Alignment (Labour Party and Mapam).92  
90  Spinzas, 1989, page 228. 
 
91 The Histadrut (General Federation of Laborers in the Land of Israel) was founded in 1920 and is the Israeli 
trade and workers union with 650 000 members today. Since the economical liberation in the 1980’s the 
Histadrut has lost more than half of its members, but it is still a powerful force in the society and national 
economy of Israel. Until 1959 it was a pure Jewish organization and provided most of the workers and work in 
Israel to Jews only. The Histadrut was important for delegating jobs especially for the arriving new Jewish 
immigrants in Israel. 
 
92 Arian, 1975, page 10. 
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Likewise, they did not manage the 1 percent threshold for the 8th Knesset elections on 
December 31st, 1973. The other 5 “Oriental” lists also did not pass 1 percent, and Likud 
benefited from that new ethnic awareness during the elections for the 9th Knesset in 1977.  
The election for the 8th Knesset should have been on October 27th, 1973, but was delayed until 
the end of the war. The exact date was chosen by the leading Labor-Mapam Alignment and by 
Golda Meir because of the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva that had taken place one 
week before. The ruling Party took advantage of this situation.  
Yitzhak Rabin wrote in his memoirs:  
According to opinion polls held at the time, even had the war not broken out and had 
the elections been held on time, the Alignment, which had lost 3.7 per cent in the 
Histadrut elections held in September 1973, would have lost several seats in the 
Knesset, and the results would have been quite similar to what they actually were. The 
Alignment received 51 out of the Knesset’s 120 seats – down from 56 in the elections 
to the 7th Knesset held in October 1969, but certainly not a result which pointed to a 
political earthquake.” 93
The people's dissatisfaction found its expression during the 1977 elections. During the period 
after the war, the Likud Party became more and more popular because of the war hero Ariel 
Sharon. First, Likud increased it's representation in the Knesset from 31 to 39 seats in the 
1977 election. Shulamit Aloni ran for the Civil Rights Movement (Ratz) and received three 
seats. Also in 1977, Yigal Yadin’s new Democratic Movement for Change (Dash) managed to 
activate protest votes for his side. From that time on, the Alignment under Golda Meir had 
difficulties forming a new coalition and a new political environment started to take shape. 
They had to deal with new developments that had an influence on foreign policy as well. The 
effect of that new pluralistic system had its impact on the public by emphasizing issues of 
religion and feminism. The Six Day War reminded people of their heritage; the Yom Kippur 
War raised general existential questions and caused a radicalization of political positions, 
especially among the younger generation of leaders in the National Religious Party.  
 
 
93 Rabin, 1979, page 236. 
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The integrity of “Eretz Israel” and the future of the occupied territories were greatly 
influenced by the ultra-orthodox rabbis. The tendency to emphasize the Jewish character of 
the State of Israel was set by the NRP (National Religious Party) and gained support from 
many Israeli citizens. On the other hand, there was the feminist movement that swept into 
Israel from the United States in the early 1970’s. Marsha Friedmann, who emigrated from the 
USA, became the head of this movement. In December 1973, she entered the Knesset because 
she was placed in the third position on Shulamit Aloni’s list from Ratz. The Yom Kippur War 
gave the feminist a certain moral push forward. From the right-wing perspective, The Land of 
Israel Movement (LIM) and Gush Emunim were the most influential circles in Israel.  
LIM was convinced that the post Six Day War borders had saved Israel from destruction. 
Thanks to the buffer zones of the Sinai Peninsular and the Golan Heights, Israel had had more 
time to call the reservists to the battlefields. From that point of view, any concessions of land 
to the Arabs should be refused. They supported new settlements of Jews in the occupied 
territories. Even more influential was the “Block of the Faithful,” formed in March 1974 and 
better known as the Gush Emunim movement. Former students from the Merkaz Harav 
Yeshiva in Jerusalem, under their spiritual leader, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (1865-1935), were 
not only against any land concessions, they even pushed the idea of Israeli sovereignty over 
the occupied territories. Originally, Gush Emunim was a faction of the NRP (National 
Religious Party), but soon they gave up their party connection and became active and 
effective as a political NGO in Israel. To present, their philosophy and dogmas have great 
influence on right wing Israelis, especially concerning the question of guilt and its results.  
The Black Panthers, the Yom Kippur War Movement and Gush Emunim all had a great impact 
on the Israeli Arabs. The Land Day Demonstrations of March 30th, 1976, were the start of 
their struggle for equality. Israeli law enforcement forces killed six Israeli Arabs during that 
demonstration, and Israeli Arabs considered those killed to be martyrs for their rights. 
Eventually, the Yom Kippur War and its influence on the individual even had an impact on the 
Palestinian Arabs.  
Finally, the Peace Now Movement appeared after Anwar Sadat’s historical visit to Jerusalem 
in November 1977. Even though it was an indirect outcome of the Yom Kippur War; it had a 
radical influence on the Israeli peace movement. It supported the group of Israelis who 
believed that Israel had to seek for peace with its neighbours in the way of “Land for Peace”.  
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This could only happen after the Yom Kippur War had weakened the three “no’s” (no peace, 
no recognition and no negotiation with Israel) of the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference94 
and the growing connections between the PLO and the so-called “Israeli Peaceniks” after the 
Geneva Conference.  
 
94 The Khartoum Resolution September 1st, 1967: 
1.  The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for 
coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the 
other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by an implementation 
of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca. 
2.  The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the 
aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these 
lands falls on all the Arab States. 
3.  The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and 
diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the 
aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. 
This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, 
namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the 
rights of the Palestinian people in their own country. 
4.  The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension 
of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the 
summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive 
weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States 
directly affected by the aggression, so that these states will be able to stand firm in the battle. The 
conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource 
that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States 
which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate 
the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing states have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable 
the states affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure. 
5.  The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an 
Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the Baghdad 
conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil. 
6.  The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen 
military preparation to face all eventualities. 
7.  The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States. 
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It should be mentioned that the Khartoum Arab Resolution, even it was a moderate (namely a 
political statement instead of a militaristic one) Arab reaction to the defeat of the Six Days 
War, diminished Israel’s opportunity to deal politically with the new status quo in the Arab 
world.95
In fact, the resolution describes a common policy of the Arab states towards Israel that led to 
Israeli support for the “no peace, no war” policy. 
95 See: Shalim, 2000, pages 258-259.  
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10 How did the Yom Kippur War change Israel’s defense doctrine? 
10.1  The IDF`s Defense Doctrine  
The basic foreign-policy position of the IDF can be viewed as force-centered, seeking 
to provide for the security of the state through adequate supply of arms and the 
utilization of force to best advantage, given the perceived numerical imbalance in the 
strategic situation. In the past, this policy has included retaliation in force and the use 
of “interceptive” or preemptive warfare against the Arab states. In the 1956 and 1967 
wars, the IDF sought to establish a policy of “decisive victories”, a policy the IDF 
feels was not followed in the 1973 war, when the military’s recommendation to reject 
the Soviet cease-fire ultimatum was voted down by the Cabinet.96
After the war, the government and the IDF traced the problem of its unpreparedness to the 
communication within the army and the interaction between the formal and informal channels 
used by the government and its policy makers. The internal failures of intelligence analysis 
prevented mobilization, and an interceptive war became required.97 Originally, there were 
weekly meetings of the General Staff, which were generally attended by the Defense Minister. 
He represented the military's view to the Cabinet. This system functioned successfully until 
the Yom Kippur War. As the result of the war, frequent ad hoc discussions and meetings 
between the military and political leaderships were added. This direct and steady open 
channel was intended to support and influence policy decision-making. After Meir had left, 
the new Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin (a former Chief of Staff), placed Chief of Staff Motta 
Gur into his informal circle. As a result, the IDF’s greater influence on daily politics became 
more of a problem than ever before. 
 
 
 
 
96 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 182. 
  
97 See: Ben-Porat, in: Foreign Policy making, 1974, page 181. 
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10.2 Changes in the internal information channel  
The Agranat Commission blamed Israel’s national intelligence for crucial failures.98 This was 
surprising because this national intelligence system had acquired a reputation for being the 
best intelligence service on the subject of the Middle East in the world. Later on it became 
reasonable because the Agranat Commission was not allowed to question the political leaders. 
Therefore the Commission did only half the job.  
Over the years the Israeli national intelligence system grew into different branches like the 
Mossad99, Foreign Ministry Research Division, the Internal Security and Counter Espionage 
Service (Shabak), the agency responsible for Jews in "countries of persecution” and the 
Central Intelligence Collection Agency. In 1969, a new group for "Combating the Palestinian 
Guerrillas" appeared. The officers of this new group were mainly those who had been experts 
in the Sinai serving on the border between Egypt and Israel. Before the Yom Kippur War, 
there was an urgent need for highly capable and informed military officers and intelligence 
officials at the Egyptian border. 
One of the major tasks of the Secret Service is the observation of Arab neighbors´ activities. 
Together with the IDF, the Intelligence follows a military policy that is without doubt directly 
connected to the Arab foreign policy. These Short-Run Security Policy Objectives include: 
“… combining military elements with technology, geography, and other factors, these 
goals call for Israel’s maintenance of its security through active deterrence of the 
Arab states, external terrorist attacks, and internal dissension. At a minimum, these 
objectives include the following:  
Active deterrence of the Arab states from first strikes on Israeli positions;  
98 See: Knorr, in: World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, April 1964. 
 
99 Mossad (The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) is one of the (several) main Intelligence 
Communities such as AMAN (military intelligence) and Shabak (Internal security), but its director reports 
directly to the Prime Minister. Its tasks are (like the CIA [USA] and the M16 [GB]) covert actions, counter 
terrorism, intelligence collection and paramilitary activities. 
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Israeli capability to undertake both first-strike and second-strike actions against the 
Arab states, as conditions might warrant - including the capability to undertake 
limited operations against hostile forces;  
Ability to check or control terrorist incursions - while no leader expects to 
“hermetically seal” the borders, protection of border settlements from escalated 
terrorist strikes has become increasingly important;  
Maintenance of secure borders or interim cease-fire lines, in the absence of a 
negotiated settlement; maintenance of technology superiority in weapon systems.”100
Additionally, AMAN had specific tasks: Getting information about the material used by the 
Soviet advisors who were teaching the leading and execution basics to Arab armies, collecting 
knowledge about Eastern Block weapon technology and tools, estimating the size of the 
enemies force, quickly realizing and informing the government about changes in military 
balance and discovering Arab attack plans and dates.101 The remaining functions are standard 
for a military Secret Service: Collecting knowledge about the terrain of military action and 
securing the highly-ranked officers on this field, military censorship, development of special 
Secret Service technology, receiving information from agents outside of Israel, maintaining 
relations with foreign military representatives in Israel and gathering technical information.102 
It was to Israel’s disadvantage that the following were not within AMAN’s realm of 
operations at that time: 
 
“Examination of the mutual interrelations between opposing military doctrines must be very 
studiously prepared, taking special care not to project one's own doctrine onto the enemy 
More attention must be paid to intentions, as the enemy almost always has the capabilities to 
initiate some sort of attack surprise further strengthening these capabilities. Above all, in 
situations where political gains are more important than military victory, the decisions to 
initiate war are not always directly related to one's related capabilities. It must also be borne 
100 McLaurin,/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 206. 
 
101 See: Wagenlehner, 1968, page 51. 
102 See: Wagenlehner, 1968, Seite 51. 
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in mind that, in the context of deterrence, one can influence the enemy's mind, his intentions 
to go to war: but one cannot have any impact on his capabilities. 
 
 
The existence of only one concept or analytical framework is dangerous. It would be safer to 
have several competing concepts for the interpretations of the enemy's intentions. Competing 
concepts and approaches must be encouraged through various methods, such as the parallel 
existence of more than one intelligence agency, pluralism of opinions within each intelligence 
agency, competitive but coordinated collections of information, devil‘s advocates, and so on. 
It is better to error on the side of having too flexible and opens a conceptual framework than 
one too rigid and closed. It must be remembered, though, that the presence of several 
competing intelligence agencies is no panacea, and that such structures create other 
problems that must be taken into account. Special attentions must be given to better 
coordination, collaborations and integration of the intelligence work done in the various 
agencies.  
Better integration between military and political intelligence must be encouraged. Evaluation 
of military situations cannot be made in a political vacuum and vice versa. It is not desirable, 
therefore, that all intelligence activity should be controlled by the military. While this seems 
to be a simple and straightforward conclusion, most cases of strategic surprise evidence a 
prior lack of coordination between political-diplomatic activities and military activity on the 
part of the victim. Available information should be used more liberally and passed more 
willingly to lower or parallel echelons. Information and opinion exchange should be 
conducted both upwards and downwards in the intelligence hierarchy. Better coordination 
between field or tactical intelligence and intelligence headquarters must be ensured."103
 
It is a matter of fact that the intelligence measures the capability of the enemy only and not its 
intentions.104
Golda Meir made a mistake by ignoring the Foreign Ministry, whose job is to interpret 
foreign intentions. Instead of following its advice, she placed military and intelligence-
officials more highly. But these officers missed the major foreign policy change within the 
103 Handel, 1976. 
104 The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 64. 
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Arab leadership and its movement towards war against Israel. As a result, in 1974, the AMAN 
was split into two sections in order to avoid repeating such a disaster. 
This new IDF intelligence Corps (HAMAN) was separated from the AMAN but remained 
under its jurisdiction. It is to this day an Israeli Defense Force corps and is responsible for 
collecting, disseminating and publishing intelligence information for the political decision-
makers and the General Staff. It makes general assessments, and its creation was 
recommended by the Agranat Commission. They conclude that the Chief Intelligence Officer 
should be detached from but subordinate to the head of AMAN. 
This change was not caused by the Agranat Commission alone. Dayan’s pre-Yom Kippur War 
defense doctrines of “force-centered policy of retaliation” (established in 1955 as a reaction of 
increasing Arab Terror attacks) and the policy of “decisive victories”, carried out in the 1956 
and 1967 conflicts were proved to be unsuccessful. Syria went to war against Israel despite its 
military weaknesses. The strategic military outposts were not as strong as predicted and 
Israel’s air superiority was hurt by the Arab air defense. After the War, Israel was more 
dependent on the U.S.A. than ever before, additional diplomatically isolated and had lost 
support in the international community.105
105 See: Ma’oz, 1995, page 133. 
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Israel’s policy and the world community 
11 Israel’s foreign policy’s impact on the international arena after the Yom Kippur War 
From the Yishuv era until the 1967 War, Israel tried hard to prove to the world its importance 
in that region in order to receive support. At that time, Israel had its own foreign policy 
towards the international arena, especially regarding the “black” African states. The reason 
was the Nation Building Process:  
“What attracted the Africans to Israel was that it too was an emerging state which had 
created a variety of social-economic institutions as it had tackled the problems of 
economical development.”106  
Israel’s help in developing African states' militaries and infrastructure as well as their 
agriculture gave the Jewish state the guarantee of support in the UN Assembly. Additionally, 
they received high respect in world public opinion: 
“The geographic distribution of Israel’s assistance programs also illustrates clearly 
the dominant position of Africa in Israeli foreign policy toward the Third World. 
During the 15 years from the projects were first initiated in Africa to the breaking of 
diplomatic relations in 1973, 3.017 Israeli experts worked on short or longer term 
projects in Africa, constituting nearly two thirds of all its experts that were sent to the 
Third World. Occasionally there was even optimism in Jerusalem that the support of 
the African states for Israel would force the Arabs to accept Israel’s right to exist and 
lead to peace in the region.”107
Israel hoped to normalize its international position and its leaders were eager to overcome the 
diplomatic and political isolation. Meir, at that time the foreign minister: 
”Israel wants something in return for the cooperation and goodwill it brings to 
African peoples and governments. This great thing is friendship”.108
106 Peters, 1992, pages 4. 
 
107 Peters, 1992, pages 14. 
 
108 Peters, 1992, pages 4. 
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The Arab states had been intent on undermining Israel’s presence in Africa. At the Casablanca 
conference in 1961, they unsuccessfully tried to drag the African states away from Israel.  
At the OAU meetings, the Arab nations urged the Africans again and again to show solidarity 
with their cause and to stop diplomatic relations with the neo-colonialist state of Israel:  
“The pressure was particularly prominent at the OAU summit in May 1973 and the 
Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1973. It intensified during the 
weeks of the war itself.”  
Finally the Arab states got what they wanted:  
“It was not any new-found ideological affinity with the Arabs that led the Africans to 
switch sides but rather economic and political opportunism.” 109  
Officially, the African states stated that they broke with Israel because they were obeying UN 
and OAU resolutions. But soon after the war, the African states became disillusioned by the 
failure of the Arabs to keep their promise of aid and investment and lost confidence that the 
Arabs would help them economically. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel was seen 
again as a valuable contact point with the West and as an influential, if not indispensable, 
intermediary with the United States in order to receive greater aid and investments from 
America. Sékou Touré in 1984: 
“It is true that some African states have changed their policy toward relations with 
Israel, and they had reason to do so. The fact is that the attitude of the Arab League 
had not encouraged those states to refrain from having relationships with Israel.”110
 
But there was no going back: The funds for embarking on large-scale aid projects in Africa 
were no longer available and Israel had fundamentally changed its foreign policy. 
 
109 Peters, 1992, pages 44 and 45. 
 
110 Peters, 1992, page 181. 
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Israel-European Diplomacy and the need for new energy policies has its origins in the Yom 
Kippur War, too. There was no major impact on Europe by the Middle East until the oil crisis 
started as a result of the conflict.  
„Arab pressures and the threat of the ‘oil weapon’ played a major role in October 
1973 in forcing the major industrialized countries of the West to readjust their Middle 
East policies.”111  
The Arab world considered some European states to be supporters of the U.S. and Israeli 
foreign policy. As a result, OPEC punished Europe and the U.S. through the famous, illegal 
oil embargo (the 1970 UN Renewal Assembly Resolution No. 2625 – for which the Arabs 
voted – forbade the use of economic or other measures to coerce other states112) as a way to 
force Israel’s withdrawal from and acceptance of a Palestinian state. After the first shock, 
Europe and the U.S. realized that they would not run out of oil, but the price would rise 
enormously. Oil was the highest priority of the European states concerning the Middle East. 
All questions about political influence in this region were connected to this topic: In the 
1950's, approximately 75 % of Europe's requirements of primary energy were covered by coal 
and only 10 % by oil. Through the 1970's, oil had continued to drastically replace coal as an 
energy source and went up to 60 % of Europe's energy supply, whereas coal declined to 33 %; 
the rest consisted of hydroelectric power, nuclear energy and other sources113. This created an 
overwhelming dependence on the Middle East oil, due in large part to cheap prices on the 
world market. During the Suez War in 1956, the EC realized for the first time that there was a 
difference between cheap oil and secure oil. This became especially true after the Six Days 
War when a number of Arab states undertook an oil boycott against some pro-Israeli 
European states and the USA. This oil embargo failed, but it pushed the EC Commission in 
1968 to produce a series of recommendations in its "First Guidelines for a Common Energy 
Policy". 
However, different interests between the single countries in West Europe made a common 
energy policy impossible and the OPEC took advantage of it, gaining more power than would 
have been necessary. Politically, France was still interested in gaining more power in the 
region to counterbalance the domination of the British and the U.S. after World War II. 
111 Peters, 1992, pages 49.  
 
112 See: Gardner, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, Number 3, April 1974, page 567. 
   
113 See: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1973, page 265.  
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Therefore, France had its own unilateral interests, Germany was connected to the US through 
the NATO, Great Britain was trying to protect its failing coal industry and Italy was 
dependent on imports of the cheapest energy resources available on the market. Germany, 
France and Belgium depended of the natural gas of the Netherlands. Britain and the 
Netherlands were the home of Shell and BP. These companies also had their own interests in 
this region and played an important role in this conflict. All these different positions created 
dramatic diplomatic bargaining during and after the Yom Kippur War.  
 
The EC tried to avoid being involved in the Yom Kippur War. On October 17th, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced its embargo in order to 
use oil as a tool to achieve their interests in the conflict with Israel. OPEC divided the 
countries into three categories: countries like US and the Netherlands, which were not to 
receive Arab oil at all, "friendly" countries like Britain and France, which would stay at the 
normal supply level, and other countries that were met with a reduction of 5 % per month 
until the OPEC reached its final political goals. From October 1973 through January 1974, the 
oil price rose from $ 2 to $ 10 per barrel.114
This crisis hit Europe suddenly and caused panic. Britain refused to support the American 
airlift by not providing its base in Cyprus, which provoked Kissinger's anger and led to a 
temporary ban on the exchange of American intelligence information with Great Britain. 
Britain’s Prime Minister, Heath,115 also refused to support an early cease-fire resolution at the 
UN. For that action, OPEC honored Great Britain as an “Arab friendly” country. Germany 
was loading US ships en route to Israel with U.S. arms at Bremerhaven, until the Press 
discovered it on October 24th .Germany declared its neutrality and stopped further shipments. 
Italy also refused to open up its bases to the US, and France even exported tanks for oil to 
Libya and Saudi Arabia. Only Portugal provided its bases to American aircraft. Otherwise, the 
airlift would have been impossible. After the "Defcon 3" military alert on October 25th, 
France and Britain denied any help to either the Soviets or the US to install an international 
emergency force to supervise the cease-fire.  
114 See: Lieber, in: Harvard Studies in international Affairs, Number 35, United States of America, 1976.  
 
115 Sir Edward Richard George Heath (July 9th, 1916 –July 17th, 2005) was Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom from 1970 until 1974. He was the leader of the Conservative Party from 1965 to 1975. 
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The Dutch (the government had good connections to the Austrian Prime Minister Kreisky116) 
were punished for offering a substitute to the closed transit center in the Austrian castle of 
Schönau, which housed Russian immigrants in transit to Israel. The Dutch government was 
also punished for its position towards the Arab states.  
The Dutch Foreign Minister, Max van der Stoel,117 announced that Syria and Egypt had 
unilaterally broken the so-called coexistence maintained from 1970.118 Ultimately, the 
absence of a common European foreign energy policy was the reason for heavy diplomatic 
controversies between the European states. Therefore, OPEC played a game of “everybody 
against everybody”. Europe could not stop the embargo even though it had supported the 
Arabs in UN Resolution 242, demanding that Israel withdraw to its cease-fire lines of 1967 
and recognize Palestinian rights. France and Britain, however, did have had their own 
common policy. Kissinger encouraged co-operation between the western allied countries, 
particularly the U.S. and Japan, via the OECD: 
"Will we consume ourselves in nationalistic rivalry which the realities of 
independence make suicidal? Or will we acknowledge our independence and shape 
cooperative solutions?"119  
Both Kissinger and Nixon managed to convince Britain to adapt the American position 
concerning security at the start of 1974. Nixon had said: “Security and economy 
considerations are inevitably linked and energy cannot be separated from either."120
Also, the unexpected electoral defeat of Heath's Conservative government led to a new British 
position. Still, France preferred its own special individual arrangements concerning its oil 
imports, even as the question of unity was at stake when a total oil embargo was issued 
against the Netherlands.  
The Dutch Foreign Minister referred to the EC principles (EEC's Treaty of Rome) that 
required a guarantee of equitable fuel supplies for all members.121  
116 Bruno Kreisky (January 22nd, 1911 –July 29th, 1990) was Chancellor of Austria from 1970 until 1983. He was 
a very influential social-democrat politician who became very well known especially in the Arab world for his 
pro Palestinian position.  
 
117 Max van der Stoel (August 3rd, 1924) was the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Oil-crises. 
118 See: Le Monde, October 10th, 1973. 
 
119  New York Times, February 12, 1974. 
 
120  New York Times, February 15th, 1974. 
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France however, was afraid to lose its Arab allies.  
Despite the earlier expressed willingness of public opinion in the EC to support the 
principle of members countries mooning to the aid of another member in the event of 
an economic or energy crisis and despite the various commitments contained in the 
Community Treaty, the Nine (EC) were unable or unwilling to present a publicly 
united front on the behalf of the Dutch. In this sense, the energy crisis was considered 
a matter of national survival.122
Nevertheless, the Dutch had resources of natural gas and warned France, Belgium and 
Germany that they would switch them off if they did not get oil from its partners. As France 
imported 40 % of its gas supply from the Netherlands to meet the demands in the area of 
Paris, a solution was necessary. France made a commitment not to part itself from its partners 
of the Common Market; meanwhile, the US encouraged the international oil companies to 
provide oil to the Dutch. Royal Dutch/Shell:  
"The allocation of oil as a percentage of demand to all markets appeared to be the 
most equitable and practicable course of action in the circumstances. Indeed it was 
the only defensible course if governments were not collectively to agree on any 
alternative preferred system."123
In return, the Dutch Prime Minister Joop den Uyl124 pledged that no transport of weapons or 
volunteers to Israel would be based in Holland. Furthermore, he characterized the Israeli 
occupation of Arab territories as "illegal".125 The Netherlands even agreed to let Arab oil pass 
through the port of Rotterdam on its way to the "Arab friendly" Belgium.  
 
 
 
121 See: The Economist, November 24th, 1973.  
 
122 Lieber, in: Harvard Studies in international Affairs, Number 35, United States of America,  
              1976, page 14. 
 
123 Chandler, in: Petroleum Review, June 1974, quoted in Statement of Professor Robert B.  
               Stough, page 14. 
 
124 Dr. Johannes Marten Joop den Uyl (August 9th 1919 –December 24th 1987) was the Prime Minister of the 
Netherlands from 1973 until 1977. He was a very idealistic and controversial social-democratic politician. 
125 New York Times, December 5th, 1973.  
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Finally, the Arabs lifted their embargo in the middle of July, 1974 as  
"… an expression of the concern felt by the Arab states in respect of a united 
European entity and in consideration of the relations which it is desired to establish 
between the Arab nation and the European Community".126
France, despite of its own interests, saw its position as a step that unified Europe without US 
assistance and as an important step to prove Europe's independence. However, this brought 
the other eight partners in the EC into a great dilemma. To follow the French position would 
have meant a serious break with the US, although the US was in a superior economic and 
military situation, providing the kind of security guaranty that France could not provide. On 
the other hand, France was still needed as part of a common European policy. Finally, in 
September 1974, the EC Council worked out an energy guideline that called for decreased oil 
imports, increased efficiency of its use, a coordinated plan to deal with shortages and more 
research development, especially in the nuclear sector.  
Additionally, the newly created International Energy Agency (IEA) should work as a common 
umbrella. Still, France did not join the IEA and proclaimed in April 1975 that it would act as 
its national interest dictated.  
 
To summarize: There was some progress, but a common energy policy of the EC remained 
only a vision. The oil crisis supported the interest on internal loans but was followed by 
inflation and economical stalemate. The oil embargo was one of the reasons why the 
European Union (EU) was later established. It was clear that, without a common foreign 
energy policy, every European state was disadvantaged. The situation of "divide et impera" 
was created by OPEC, simply because they could.  
One of the reactions of the Israeli diplomats against the Arabs was an anti-boycott campaign 
in the USA, resulting from the refusal of the West European states to support Israel by 
allowing American air shipments to Israel, that unfortunately strengthened the “whole world 
is against us” complex. The sympathy of Europe for the PLO and UN Resolution 3379, which 
stated that Zionism is equal to Racism, supported this point of view in the Israeli public.  
126 Communiqué issued by the Conference of Arab Oil Ministers, Cairo, July 10th, 1974. 
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12  “Superpowers” interests in the Yom Kippur War 
Israel was not particularly interested in the two Cold War superpowers until the outbreak of 
the Six Days War. In 1967, Egypt’s President Nasser threatened Israel and closed the sea-
route through Tiran in order to strengthen his position in the Arab world. The superpowers 
had reasons to end the resulting 1967 War, but the Yom Kippur War created the high potential 
for a global confrontation. 127 At that point, the USA was involved and both the USSR and the 
US had to confess their connection to their allies through aid, weapon deliveries and human 
material. The US involved itself through the creation of the air bridge, and this has been 
considered the first step from diplomacy to action. In October 1973, both superpowers had to 
show their true colors because otherwise, all that had been said before would be seen as only 
lip service. The US airlift was a signal to the Arabs that the USA was not about to abandon 
their ally, Israel. Psychologically, it was extremely important for the morale of the Israeli 
soldiers as much as for the people of Israel, although it was quite difficult for Israeli diplomats 
to convince the US to install the air bridge. Without that kind of support, the war would have 
ended differently. The air bridge's creation (Operation Nickel-grass), which needed the 
personal order of Nixon (who was convinced by Kissinger) really saved Israel from defeat.  
There were six reasons that made the American airlift nearly impossible: 
1) The planes would have to fly over and land in a battle zone. To risk materials and, even 
worse, American citizens were hard to legitimize in front of the US public.  
2) The USA and the rest of the American allies were afraid of the results of an Arab oil 
embargo resulting from delivery of weapons.  
3) The political pressure from by this action, from both the "Third World" and from Europe 
and Japan, would be enormous.  
4) President Nixon was currently involved in the "Watergate Scandal“128. He could not afford 
another political failure.  
127 See: Bunzl, 1997, page 80-85. 
128 The “Watergate” scandal (1972-1975) refers to burglaries of the headquarters of the Democratic National 
Committee in the Watergate Hotel in Washington D.C and its aftermath. The connection between the burglaries 
and U.S. President Nixon forced him to resign on August 9th, 1974. 
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5) Inside the State Department and the Pentagon, some people were in favor of the Arab 
position and they were willing to refuse their cooperation or even sabotage the attempts to 
start the airlift as soon as possible.  
6) The greatest risk was the possibility of an extreme Soviet reaction and the danger to the 
future of the détente.129
Some are convinced that Kissinger’s support was based solely on his family history during 
World War II, when he lost 13 members of his family in the Shoa. But his approach was much 
more professional than that. He quickly realized that a delay in delivering military supplies to 
Israel might affect the outcome of the war and thus destroy his entire international strategy.  
The Russian airlift started on October 8th, after hard pressure from Sadat. The Soviets had to 
provide their ally assistance, even though they were certain that Asad and Sadat would lose 
the war. The assistance consisted mostly of medical supplies, blankets and, post October 14th, 
monetary payments. However, even these deliveries were purposefully delayed. Once again, 
the Politburo had been caught in the middle. They did not want Soviet advanced weapon 
technology to fall into Israeli hands, but at the same time, they were worried that without an 
increasing supply of aid, the Arab armies would collapse. During the air bridge, the Soviets 
tried everything to come to a cease-fire agreement and pushed for it even harder after the 
successful Israeli counter-attacks on the Golan Heights. At that time, on October 12th, Israel 
received the first warning from Moscow not to advance further. At the same time, the Soviets 
opened the borders for Jewish emigration to Israel in order to pacify the West and to backup 
lost Israeli manpower.  
So the détente was kept. October 12th was also the date when the airlift was stopped. 
However, the shipments on both sides continued and reached a very dangerous stage during 
that war.130
Moscow felt it had to make a strong stand because they were afraid that they would other lose 
Arab allies to the US, and this would put rockets on their front door, as was the case in 
Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis. They already knew that Sadat wanted to go to war in 
129 Détente is a French word for relaxing and it describes the effort for de-escalation between two nations in the 
international, diplomatic, political arena. This term was primarily used during the period of the Cold War for 
reducing the tension between the USA and the Soviet Union in order not to slip into a direct confrontation 
between each other.  
 
130 See: Golan, in: Israeli Affairs, Vol. 6, 1999-2000. 
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1973, after he had proclaimed “The year of decision” in 1971, during which no solution or 
conflict had occurred. Moscow kept its foreign policy of détente by believing that it would 
prevent the war by denying the Arabs offensive weaponry. After the war had started, an early 
cease-fire was the highest Soviet priority. Moscow realized that the Yom Kippur War had 
created a high chance of a disaster for the USSR. If Israel had lost, the Americans would have 
intervened and Soviet soldiers would have had to be sent. If Egypt had lost, they would have 
had to be sent anyway. So, even without Egypt's agreement, Moscow joined the US in calling 
for a cease-fire before the UN. 
To help Egypt as much as they could in order to prevent it from repeating a heavy defeat like 
in the Six Days War, the Soviets sent 20.000 foreign Russian military personnel and advanced 
USSR defensive missiles (SAM) to Egypt‘s territory. During the Yom Kippur War, the USSR 
set its naval squadron opposite to the American Sixth Fleet as a show of support to the Arabs. 
After the war, the media would mistakenly interpret this as the reason for the Atomic Alert. 
Moscow’s policy of arming its Arab allies, but never enough, in order to avoid bigger 
problems with the USA harmed the Soviet relationship with the Arab states in the long run. 
The weapons the Soviets were required to deliver to Egypt and Syria as part of their 
agreements were mostly second generation, and they were always purposefully sent after a 
great delay.  
 
When the war broke out, the Arab armies won battle after battle during the first period, and 
Sadat knew that Israel was not ready for a long-term war. Egypt and Syria had significant 
advantages and gained more territory each and every hour. They refused, of course, any 
cease-fire negotiation.  
At the moment when the US air bridge and Sharon's breakthrough turned the tables, the Arabs 
pushed the Soviets hard to get into contact with the USA to try to persuade them to stop 
Israel’s advance.  
At that point, Kissinger pretended to be out of his office as long as he could. Finally, Nixon 
dispatched him to Moscow on October 20th, but it was already too late for the Egyptians, as 
the Israelis had encircled the 3rd Army. Egypt found itself in a very bad negotiating position. 
On October 22nd, the UN Security Council approved the cease-fire. Unfortunately, the 
Egyptian soldiers did not stop shooting and Israel encircled the town Suez and sealed the 
escape of the Egyptian 3rd Army. This new situation was not in the interest of the USA and 
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especially not in the interest of Kissinger's plans. Nixon was afraid that the destruction of the 
3rd Army would bring Sadat's regime to collapse. Kissinger agreed with this assessment, and 
they decided to help Egypt. They even raised the possibility of sending American planes with 
food, medical supplies and water to the encircled army. Both “Superpowers” agreed that the 
conflict had to stop immediately. 
Only the U.S.A. could prevent Egypt from a defeat. Kissinger’s “Shuttle Diplomacy” had its 
effect and the Russian Politburo was caught in the middle, especially in the last days of the 
war, when Israel was only some miles away from Cairo and Damascus. Kissinger started his 
plan called "Diplomacy of Peace," in which he wanted Israel to achieve victory over Egypt, 
but not to destroy or humiliate Egypt. To find the right balance was a delicate act of 
diplomacy, and he hoped to remove Egypt from the Soviet sphere of influence. To get them 
into the boat of the "West," he had to save the regime of President Sadat. The intent was to 
discourage Sadat from the option of war and make him submit to peace negotiations. 
However, the hope was that, at the end of Kissinger’s plan, Sadat would place blame on 
Russia and not on the US.  
The plan was successful, and Egypt changed sides. This created a whole new political 
situation in the Middle East. The USSR was “out”; the U.S.A., because of Israel, was “in”. 
From now on, Israel had to adapt to Washington’s policies. The diplomatic results of the air-
bridge and, of course, the oil-crises had huge economic effects. The US airlift and the further 
upgrading of the Middle East arms race after the Yom Kippur War were a heavy burden on 
Israel’s external debt. From 1973 until 1984, that debt increased from 30 to 40 per cent of the 
GNP.131 The internal debt still exists today.  
The only one who took advantage of that diplomatic battle seemed to be Kissinger. He 
managed to take away the initiative in the Middle East from the Soviet Union and turn into an 
advantage for the USA in the long run, while giving them the feeling that they were still 
partners. He won that Cold War confrontation without destroying the détente:  
"Indeed, among both Gaullist and opposition tanks, there existed a common 
assumption that the Americans had provoked the energy crises in order to re-impose 
their economic and political domination of Europe. Apart of this opinion, however, it 
was widely observed that the U.S. had benefited from the crises both economically 
131 See: Liviatan, Peterman, in: The Israeli Economy, pages 323. 
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(through their multinational oil companies and the weakening of rival economies) and 
politically (by the reassertion of their leadership).132
François Mitterand133 said at the International Social Conference in Berlin:  
"The U.S. profits from the situation in order to reinforce their economic domination 
over Western Europe".134
After the war, Kissinger met the American Jewish leadership to discuss the outcome of the 
war. First he believed that Israel was mistaken in making the preservation of the status quo 
the main strategic object. He faulted Israel with overconfidence, and believed that Israel 
should have made concessions in attempting to reach a peace settlement after the Six Days 
War. Kissinger rejected the fact that the US prevented Israel from undertaking a preventive 
strike that would have changed the outcome of the war or even stopped it beforehand because 
the military situation had been changing since 1967. For example, the Russian SAM rockets 
were very effective against the Israeli air force.  
The most important question came from Mr. Podhoretz to Kissinger: “Couldn't they (Israeli 
army) have destroyed the Third Army with two or three days more?” Kissinger: “No, they got 
two to three days more than they would otherwise have had. There was no way, given the 
international climate that the US could vote against a ceasefire.”135  
 
On the question whether Israel had defeated the Arab troops on a large scale, Sadat was sure 
that Israel was not prepared for a longtime war. Kissinger agreed:  
The problem is they (the Israeli army) have reached the limits of their strategic 
possibilities. They have lost the possibility of a quick knockout. They thought that re-
132  Lieber, in: Harvard Studies in international Affairs, Number 35, United States of America, 1976,  
               page 27. 
 
133 François Maurice Adrien Marie Mitterand (October 26th, 1916 – 8th of January 8th, 1996) was the  
      longest serving President of France from 1981 until 1995. 
 
134 Le Nouvel Observateur, No. 538, March 3, 1975. 
 
135  Shalom, in: Israel Studies, 7.1, 2002, page 200.  
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equipment was only a peacetime problem. Any war that is now foreseeable requires an 
airlift. This raises the question of the sustained political climate.  
Concerning the airlift, Kissinger said that because of the threat of oil embargoes, the airlift 
would not be possible in the future. The USA would have to pursue more peaceful efforts 
before taking such a step. Also, it was no longer certain whether Portugal would allow the US 
to use its bases again. He said that, without the airlift, Israel would have lost the war. 136
The second target was the oil embargo. Kissinger wanted to conclude the embargoes with an 
act of goodwill. The Arabs states should have realized that they needed the USA. In the 
Soviet sphere, Kissinger wanted to diminish Soviet influence without destroying their 
cooperation. Nevertheless, to come to that point, Israel and Kissinger had to fight a diplomatic 
battle in Washington over the role of the US air bridge.137
136 See: Shalom, in: Israel Studies, 7.1, 2002, page 203 and 210. 
 
137  See: Dinitz, in: Israel Affairs, Vol.6, 1999-2000. 
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Policy of scarce resources  
13 Water: The need for peace between Israel and Jordan 
When we talk about water in Israel, we are talking about a resource which is very limited in 
the whole region and is, therefore, the greatest concern in the Middle East. It is a political, 
social, religious and environmental problem and influences Israeli and Arab foreign policy.  
It is a foreign policy matter because there are some natural resources (rivers, lakes, and 
aquifers) that must be shared between four countries: Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. 
Israel’s chief strategic thinker Allon:  
“Our firm holds in the Golan Heights and the Mount Hermon is very vital not only in 
order to defend… the Hula valley from Syrian fire… Our control over the Golan 
Heights … derives from Israel’s overall strategy, since this means defending the chief 
water source.”138
The root oft the problem is connected, of course, to the climate zone and the resulting rare 
rainfall in that region. The majority of the rainfall comes between November and March. 80 
% of Israel`s water resources are in the north, but only 30 % of agriculture land is there, and 
dry years are common. Water irrigation and water collectors are crucial for the region's 
agriculture. Israel’s lifeline is the “National Water-carrier”, which pumps water from Lake 
Tiberias to the southern desert area.139 The river sources are the Hasbani, Dan and Banias, 
rivers that deliver about 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of water a year. The runoff above 
the Lake Tiberias contains 150 mcm and the Upper Tiberias 550 mcm. The last large supplier 
of water is the Yarmuk River, with 400 mcm. The Wadis in the east and west of the Jordan 
add an additional 232 mcm. All together, there is a total of 1,247 mcm of surface water, but 
the human extraction outflow is 1,265 mcm in total.140  
 
138 Ma’oz, 1995, page 113. 
 
139 See: Shuldiner, in: Das Dreieck im Sand, 50 Jahre Staat Israel, 1997, pages 264-266. 
 
140 See: Lowi, 1995, pages 115-132. 
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This gap is rising every year, caused by the growing population. If there is a dry year, the 
whole region comes into a critical, even hopeless situation, such as in 1999, when the rain in 
the winter months brought less than 250 millimeters in the Jordan Valley. The gap is filled by 
the reserves of Lake Tiberias, groundwater and non-conventional sources like wastewater and 
desalination.141  
Israel has mountain aquifers from Nazareth to Beer Sheva and a coastal aquifer from Haifa, 
which goes south along the Mediterranean to Gaza. Jordan is not as fortunate. It has thirteen 
aquifers including the Wadis. Since the Jordan/Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994, Israel has been 
sharing the northern aquifer with Jordan. Jordan extracts 20 mcm from Lake Tiberias as a 
result of the peace treaty. Israel takes these 20 mcm out of the Yarmuk in winter, stores it in 
Lake Tiberias, and returns it to Jordan in the summer.  
 
The water of Jordan that comes from the Zarka River (95 mcm) is highly polluted and 
unusable. Jordan receives most of its water, 130 mcm, from the King Abdullah Canal, which 
derives from the Yarmuk. Syria also gets most of the water (200 mcm) from the Yarmuk 
River. Israel takes 620 mcm from the Israeli National Water Carrier. Together with issues 
over the King Abdullah Canal, this caused such great political problems that they led to the 
Six Days War in 1967. As a result of land gained in this war, Israel extracts 100 mcm from the 
Upper Jordan and from Lake Tiberias. The overexploitation of groundwater in Jordan is about 
200 mcm per year, and Israel also reaches the "red line" in its aquifers.142 That is why Israel 
developed some high technological solutions, the so-called non-conventional sources, like 
wastewater management and desalination. Jordan has also started a wastewater system, a 
creative new method of agricultural irrigation, but Syria and the Lebanon are far away from 
such a step. Israel sends 220 mcm treated water from the Region of Tel Aviv to the Negev for 
irrigation. Jordan irrigates its fields with 87 mcm of wastewater per year. Jordan’s plan is to 
develop this technology enough to produce up to 200 mcm by the year 2020.143 Desalination 
on the other hand has a major disadvantage: Its high use of energy.  
141 See: Borthwick, in: Israel Affairs, Vol. 9/3, 2003. 
 
142 See: Lowi, 1995, pages 115-132. 
 
143 See: Borthwick, in: Israeli Affairs, Vol. 9/3, 2003. 
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Saudi Arabia has natural gas as a cheap source of energy, but Israel has to find another source 
and has now started a new generation of desalination plants (seawater reverse osmosis 
SWRO) in order to produce drinking water more cheaply. The first one has been already built 
in Ashkelon. Ashdod, Palmahim, Kishon and Caesarea will also be building station in the 
near future.144 Jordan is still in the planning stage. Projects are in preparation for Aqaba and 
the Jordan Valley. 
In such an unsure environment, the only way to handle this situation is through a serious plan 
of water management. Israeli reservoirs are able to accumulate around 400 mcm for a drought 
year, but the demand is around 1700 mcm. Jordan runs 400 mcm short of water every year. 
The water levels are shrinking. The gap in Jordan is not only filled by wastewater and 
desalinated water, also by non-renewable fossil water. This will cause environmental 
problems in the near future. Agriculture in Israel uses 64 % of the total water supply. In 
Jordan it is about the same. Municipalities take 29 %, and the rest is for the industry. The 
logical solution would be to reduce irrigation of agricultural land, because only 4 % of the 
GDP comes from that sector. However, to cut down the water supply to a minimum, by 
raising the price of the water, or even to close the farms, is a problematic environmental and 
political topic. Since 1999, public opinion has favored prohibiting the growing of water-heavy 
plants like cotton. The export of flowers, avocados and other fruits and plants is very 
profitable for companies, but if the water price rose to a market rate, these companies would 
not be able to compete on international markets anymore. Loosing international connections is 
always a problem for a nation, especially for an isolated country like Israel. 145
 
 
 
 
144 See: URL: http://www.water-technology.net/projects/israel 
145 See: Rouyer, Alwyn, 2000, page 26. 
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14  A sensitive political issue  
Around 40 % of the Israeli water resources are outside of the 1967 borders. 22% of the Israeli 
groundwater comes from the West bank. Israeli settlers are working on 4 % of the acres in the 
occupied territories but using 20 % of its water. This together with the question of security 
water is the reason that Israel hesitates to fulfill Resolution 242.146 To reduce agriculture in 
general is an attack against Israel’s self-definition of the Zionism movement's aims to 
overcome the anti-Semitism in Europe and Russia. The heroic Jewish farmer who takes care 
of his “own” soil and transforms desert to fertile land was a nation-building image of the early 
state of Israel. This picture is implanted in the mind of people through movies and songs. 
Giving up its own food production and starting to import from other countries like Europe, the 
USA or even Arab states is unthinkable for Israeli public policy makers and Israel’s strong 
agriculture lobby. Therefore, any kind of change is very hard to achieve. The reason for the 
increasing problem of water is the expanding population in Israel, Jordan, Syria and, 
especially, the Palestinian population. Palestinians have one of the highest birthrates in the 
world. Israel's Law of Return has brought about 750 000 immigrants to Israel over the last 15 
years. Ben Gurion described 1966 his policy like this: 
“… the scope of our defense … does not depend on our army alone … Israel can have 
no security without immigration … Security means the settlement and peopling of the 
empty areas in north and south; … the establishment of industries throughout the 
country; the development of agriculture in all suitable areas; and the building of an 
expanding (self-sufficient) economy … Security means economic independence.”147
Israel expects a population of 11-13 million in 2010. Also, Jordan has been a land of 
immigrants from Iraq, Russia and of Palestinian refugees from all Arab countries (Kuwait, 
Iran, Lebanon, and Israel). As a comparison of the differences of consumption of water 
between Jews and Arabs in this region per person per year: The average Israeli uses about 280 
liter a day. A Palestinian in Israel receives only 90 liter per day and a Jordanian uses 153 liter 
per day. The world minimum standard is 250 liter per day. 148
 
146 See: Shuldiner, in: Das Dreieck im Sand, 50 Jahre Staat Israel, 1997, pages 264-266. 
 
147 Brecher, 1974, page 183. 
 
148 See: Lustick, in: Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, page 217. 
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The whole region has used more water than nature has been able to provide, while Lake 
Tiberias has been at its minimum level most of the time and the Jordan River has carried only 
treated wastewater down to the Dead Sea. As a result, the Dead Sea is shrinking enormously. 
At present, we do not know what the climate impact would be if the Dead Sea or Lake 
Tiberias disappeared. Because of that, Israeli and Jordanian engineers are working on a 
solution to bring seawater by channels and pipes from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.  
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15  Israel’s water-policy  
Most topics in foreign policy are a matter of political or religious influence. Especially in 
Israel, with its diverse political party landscape, any common agreement, if reachable at all, is 
a compromise. But in the foreign policy issues concerning water, the dispute in Israel, the data 
and the decisions have been highly technical in nature. To understand the conflict of 1973 in 
this context, we must focus on two topics: The Johnston Plan and the Israeli National Water 
Carrier. Israel’s policy towards water was made clear by Sharett to the Knesset: 
“All who are interested to receive our co-operation in this area must be aware of one 
thing. Water for Israel is not a luxury; it is not just a desirable and helpful addition to 
our system of natural recourses. Water to us is life itself. It is bread for the nation – 
and not only bread. Without large irrigation works we will not reach high productive 
levels, to balance the economy and to achieve economic independence. And without 
irrigation we will not create an agriculture worthy of the name … and without 
agriculture – and especially a developed, progressive agriculture - we will not be a 
nation rooted in its land, sure of its survival, stable in its character, controlling all 
opportunities of production with material and spiritual resources…”149
The businessman Charles Johnston was appointed in 1955 by President Eisenhower to solve 
the water problem between Israel, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. He made the so-called 
Johnston Plan for the division of the water of the Jordan Basin, which is a point of reference 
until today. 
The Johnston Plan affected all water resources in that region, especially the headwaters of the 
Jordan River, which rises in the foothills of Mount Hermon. Its springs flow in three separate 
rivers – the Hasbani, in Lebanon, the Banyas, part of Syria until 1967, and the Dan, in Israel. 
The Yarmuk is the frontier river between Jordan and Syria for 32 kilometers and is the border 
between Israel and Jordan for 14 kilometers before it flows into the Jordan River, which flows 
30 kilometers along the Israel-Jordan border and ends in the Dead Sea.  
 
 
149   Divrei Ha-knesset, XV, pages 270, 271, 30th November 1953. 
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The Johnston Plan is practically the most important Israeli contract of all:  
“Thus the near-success of the Johnston Mission (1953-55), incorporating formal co-
operative sharing of the region’s water and de facto recognition of Israel by it’s Arab 
neighbors, makes the Jordan Water issue unique in the pattern of Arab-Israel 
relations”150
Johnston came to the conclusion that for the unencumbered division of water, the Jordan 
River belongs to Israel and the Yarmuk to Jordan, with fixed assignments to the lesser 
riparian party. The quotas were set by the Unified Plan of the so-called “Gardiner Formula”: 
 
Syria:  20 mcm from the Banyas, 22 mcm from then Jordan, and 90 mcm from the 
Yarmuk (132 mcm total). 
Lebanon:  35 mcm from the Hasbani. 
Jordan:  100 mcm from the Jordan and the residue - the bulk - from the Yarmuk. 
Israel:   25 mcm from the Yarmuk and the residue – the bulk - from the Jordan. 
 
After long and hard negotiations on the international arena and in Ben Gurion's house in Sde 
Boker, Eshkol conveyed to Johnston on February 22nd, 1955: 
We did accept but did not say so in writing, officially, because we were afraid that, if 
we did so, the Arabs would bargain for more, as is the Oriental mentality in these 
matters. Later (July 1955) we put our acceptance of the Johnston Plan in writing”151
 
 
 
150 Brecher, 1974, page 175. 
 
151 Brecher, 1974, page 202. 
77 
 
                                                
As a result, after 12 months of talks between the USA and Israel, the Draft Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed but never published. It incorporated the precise terms of the 
Revised Unified Plan: 
1. Storage facilities were to be constructed on the Yarmuk – the Maqarin Dam. As for 
the contentious issue of Lake Tiberias, final decisions as to the use of the Lake … will 
be made by the Neutral Engineering Board by 1960. 
2. Supervision was to be exercised by a three-man Neutral Engineering Board, the 
chairman to be selected by the two members whom Israel and the other Jordan Valley 
states were to designate. 
 
3. Sovereignty by Israel over all existing Israeli territory was carefully assured. 
 
4. Water allocations were set forth in accordance with the “Gardiner Formula”. 
 
With this agreement, Johnston went for his fourth visit to the Middle East from August to 
October 1955. The Arab Experts Committee approved the Draft of Memorandum of 
Understanding and recommended it to the League Council in September 1955. The League 
debated the issue for four days and the outcome on October 11th, 1955, was a rejection with 
the words “further studies”: 
Representatives of the Arab countries concerned … have studied the Arab Plan for the 
exploitation of the waters of the River Jordan and its tributaries … They have found 
that despite the efforts exerted there remain certain important points which need 
further study. It has, therefore, been decided to instruct the Experts’ Committee to 
continue their task until a decision is reached which would safeguard Arab 
interests.152
 
 
152  Statement on Arab-Israel Affairs, August 26th, 1955, in: MEA, Chronology, VI, 8-9,  
               August-September 1955, page 270. 
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Johnston’s reaction: 
“When I left the Near East only two days ago, there was not the slightest doubt that 
Israel and it’s Arab neighbors … recognize the Jordan Valley Plan as the only logical 
and equitable approach to the problem of developing a river system which belongs, in 
some part, to all of them. They have made it clear to me that, in the main, the technical 
and engineering aspects of the Plan- including the proposed division of water- are 
now satisfactory to them. They believe the remaining minor differences can readily be 
reconciled. I am sure that they can be.”153
The rejection had nothing to do with the technical matters, it was politically motivated. 
 
153  New York Herold Tribune, Forum Press Release, October 17th, 1955. 
 
79 
 
16  Israel’s National Water Carrier 
It seems to be easier to find an agreement between Israel and the Arab states concerning the 
topic of water. Because the negotiations took place over such a long period of time, Israel’s 
opposition parties had a hard time following this matter. It was apparently easier to negotiate 
over people’s basic needs in the different countries but complicated to grasp because of its 
long-term, technical nature. One example of such a longtime action was Israel’s National 
Water Carrier Project, which had been approved in 1956, coordinated with the US in 1958 
and completed in 1964. The conflict in 1967 was more than ten years after the neighbors had 
grasped the implications of this project. The question of Resolution 242 and the occupied 
territories are without a doubt connected to the springs in the north of Israel. The National 
Water Carrier is a crucial part of the “Population Dispersal Policy” of Ben Gurion. He was 
convinced that the way for the Israelis to live in peace was to settle the empty areas in the 
Negev desert. That was the reason he decided to retire in Sde Boker. To implement this plan, 
Israel needed water in the south, which had to be pumped down from the north. The plan was 
to divert 500 mcm annually through a 108-inch pipeline and canals from the Upper Jordan to 
the North Negev.  
The northern end of this pipeline was changed from the Gesher B’not Ya’akov and Dan 
Springs to Eshed Kinrot of Lake Tiberias, due to a veto by the US, UN and Syria because of 
the Demilitarized Zone. Water from the Huleh Marshes Drainage Project and from the 
Yarkon, north of Tel Aviv, was included in this project. The US supported the Project with a 
15 million US Dollar loan in 1959, as compensation for American support of Jordan in its 
East Ghor project (4 million US Dollar for irrigation of 120,000 dunam (1 dunam = 1000 
square meters) in the Jordan Valley). One reason for the 6th Days War and ultimately its 
influence on the Yom Kippur War was the decision of the Arab League in 1959 to obstruct the 
National Water Carrier. At that time, three possibilities were debated: 
1. Military action, supported by Syria and the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem 
2. Diversion of the Jordan’s headwater 
3. Political action by the UN 
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The League decided on the second option and prepared a plan to build a dam on the Hasbani 
by August 1960 and to let the water flow through a tunnel to the Litany River. The Banyas 
were to be used to irrigate land up to the Yarmuk, by using a dam in Jordan. At the Arab 
Summit Conference in 1964, the Arab League decided to take action and invested in the dam 
on the Yarmuk at the Makheiba for 29 million US Dollars in order to divert 200 mcm from 
the Banyas and the Hasbani. Eshkol’s reaction:  
We have undertaken to remain within the quantities specified in the Unified Plan – 
and we shall honor this undertaking. Israel will oppose unilateral and illegal 
measures by the Arab States and will act to protect their vital rights.”154
Israel successfully began pumping through the main conduit in May 1964, and on June 11th, 
Agriculture Minister Dayan announced the success of the 6500 kilometer long National Water 
Carrier project, which in 1970 reached a maximum of 320 mcm annually. When Israel 
destroyed the Syrian dam, it paved the road to wars on 1967 and 1973. 
 
154 Divrei Ha-knesset, XXXVIII, 20th January 1964, page 8-13. 
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17  Jordan accepts 
Jordan originally rejected the Johnston Plan and started to build the King Abdullah Channel 
in 1958. Israel built its National Water Carrier to counter Jordan's interests in 1959, and when 
in 1960 the Arab League decided to share the Upper Jordan water only between Lebanon and 
Jordan (as a result of which no water would flow to Lake Tiberias), Israel attacked and 
destroyed the dam on the Yarmuk River that was still under construction. Israel, of course, 
took the Golan Heights in the Six Days War. After that, Israel controlled the Upper Jordan and 
a longer part of the Yarmuk River. The Johnston Plan suddenly became the point of reference 
for the Jordanians when Israel left the kingdom only 120 mcm per year. Additionally, the IDF 
had bombed Jordanian water facilities on the Yarmuk and the World Bank stopped investing 
in the Maqarin Dam (Unity Dam). Jordan was not able to store water from the winter floods 
anymore and realized that the Johnston Plan would have been the best solution for Jordan, 
since it would receive 720 mcm of water per year. Israel would have had 400 mcm, Syria only 
132 mcm and Lebanon 35 mcm. Therefore, Jordan was forced to find a political solution after 
the Six Day War.155 The peace treaty in 1994 was about water. Rabin offered to return the 
land Wadi Araba and give an additional 50 mcm annually from the Yarmuk in exchange for 
peace. Furthermore, he encouraged Jordan to build the dam at Maqarin (225 mcm) and 
offered to store the water in winter for Jordan and to provide this water during the summer 
months. These steps brought peace between Jordan and Israel on October 26th, 1994, and were 
the political conclusion of the Yom Kippur War. 
One thing is for sure: This peace treaty did not come too early. Just five years later, Israel and 
Jordan faced a water crisis. In the winter months of 1998, the rainfall was less than 250 mm. 
That was a drop of 60 per cent.156 If Jordan had stood at the same point before the peace 
treaty of 1994, the world would have faced a humanity catastrophe. Irrigation water for 
agriculture was cut by half and the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization and 
the World Food Program sent 380 000 tons of food. The previously-mentioned solutions of 
water management and non-conventional sources are the future solutions for preventing the 
whole region from facing an even more dangerous situation.  
155  See: Yehuda, 1997, page 189. 
 
156 See: Sarner, in: Canadian Jewish News, 1999. 
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Israel’s foreign policy change 
18  The great Egyptian-Israeli foreign policy change 
Sadat caused a great change in Israeli foreign policy by rejecting further Soviet influence and 
bringing the US back into the Middle East. Nothing was left to say about Syria in that case. 
Asad used the weapon deliveries from the USSR in 1974 to start a War of Attrition against 
Israel as Nasser had done five years before. After the fall of the oil embargo on March 18th, 
1974, Arab Unity became a thing of the past. Syria and the USSR were left alone.157  
After five months of difficult negotiations during heavy Syrian military actions, Syria and 
Israel reached a disengagement agreement on May 31st, 1974. Syria`s tactical decision to go 
to the negotiation-table during bloody fighting was not as successful as Asad had hoped. He 
managed only to regain the town of Qunaytra and two hills in the vicinity which had been 
captured by Israel in the 1967 war. This small territorial gain was, for Syria, the political and 
psychological conclusion of the 1973 war and Asad promoted it as a great victory that it, of 
course, was not. One outcome was that Egypt received less compensation in the form of 
weapon deliveries than Syria from the USSR, but at the end of 1974, the amount of arms, 
besides the number of planes, was at the same level as before the Yom Kippur War. Syria 
received 1100 tanks, 1000 different kinds of cannons and missiles, FROG and SCUD, 
respectively, and 140 planes and tank missiles. It was a sign that Russia was not happy with 
Sadat’s new open policy to the west (Infitah).158 Asad’s policy did not change. He and the 
Ba’thist leaders continued to be extremely hostile and militant towards Israel and Zionism 
both before and after the disengagement agreement in May 1947. Asad: 
1. Zionism distorts the heavenly principle and misuses Judaism … it is an instrument to 
destroy existing societies in many countries of the world … It is an ally of Nazism ... it 
is an artificial, chauvinist phenomenon which manifests itself in the colonist ideology, 
based on usurpation and expansionism in the region … Israel has been seen by the 
world as a racist fascist state. 
2. I do not have any personal animosity against the Jewish religion or the Jew as a 
religious person. But the Jews in Israel, this is different. The Jews are our enemy … I 
feel about the Jews, the Israeli Jew … in the same way I feel about any people which 
comes and takes my land. 
157 See: Mottinger, 1988, page 125. 
 
158 See: Mottinger, 1988, page 123. 
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3. Israel’s age … is only one-sixth of the periods of the Crusaders’ dominion in our 
country. If Israel continues to occupy the Arab lands, there would be a fifth war 
against Israel … another October war wherein Syria would be the spearhead.  
4. If Israel withdraws to the original borders, we will not wage a war against it. We will 
accept the United Nations` resolution of 1947 (for the partition of Palestine) in the 
interest of getting on with other important business and simply let nature take its 
course … and then we will work behind the scenes to overthrow the Zionist system in 
Israel and bring about a just return of Arab presence there, so as to make this land an 
integral part of the Arab world … once this problem is solved then I can say that the 
Jews will be able to live here in Palestine as Jews but not as Israelis. 159  
 
In November 1975, the 12th National Congress of the Ba’ath Party decided on strategic goals, 
tactical aims and an ideological concept regarding Israel: 
1. The Zionist entity in Palestine is artificial, racist and expansionist. It constitutes the 
main attacking base of Imperialism and Zionism against the Arab Homeland, aiming 
at expanding from the Nile to the Euphrates. 
2. The whole Arab national potential should be concentrated against the imperialistic, 
colonialistic, Zionistic presence. The struggle against it is the major issue of the 
national liberation struggle. 
3. The Arab-Zionist conflict is a fatal historical struggle, a struggle for life or death, to 
be or not to be. It is a long struggle of although there are periods of relative 
tranquility and armistic; this struggle must end with the eternal elimination of Zionism 
and with the liberation of all occupied Arab territories, including the entire Arab 
Palestinian land. 
4. In order to implement goal is to obtain the full withdrawal of Israel from the 
territories occupied in 1967, including the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Then to 
assist the struggle of the Palestinian people and support its legitimate right to 
establish a national rule in the liberated territories. This is a step towards gradually 
uprooting the Zionist enemy from the land through an armed struggle, and returning 
Arab sovereignty to the full Palestinian land, on the ruins of the Zionist entity.160 
 
159 Ma’oz, 1988, page 104-106. 
 
160 Ma’oz, Moshe, 1995, page 143 and 144. 
84 
 
                                                
This program had no positive influence on Israeli policy and Israel maintained its security 
measurements to counter this. Egypt choose another way in 1972:  
Perhaps the most important change in Egyptian foreign policy took place when Sadat, 
piqued by the Soviet refusal to equip the Egyptian military with more sophisticated 
weapons, asked the Russian advisers and technicians to leave the country.161
Before the June War, these advisors had increased from 700 up to 900, and later increased to 
15.000. These technicians were originally in service as another form of Egyptian 
compensation besides Russian weapon deliveries. Egypt had a fundamental lack of good 
pilots and trained technical personnel. The exposure of the advisers was a concession to Saudi 
Arabia and Libya, who were already against the Russian presence in Egypt, and it was also a 
nod towards the USA. Additionally, Sadat`s concession to Israel was not taken seriously by 
the US and the Egyptian people became nervous.  
After the Yom Kippur War, Sadat followed his new policy and got financial support from the 
rich Arab oil-producing states like Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, with aid and loans totaling $ 2 
billion from 1974 to 1980. The Shah promised an additional investment of $ 1 billion for the 
Suez Canal Zone. Furthermore, Iran, encouraged by the USA, sent American-built weapons 
systems to Egypt so that Sadat would not be criticized within his army for the Soviet 
armaments lost during the Yom Kippur War and provided training for Egyptian pilots and 
radar technicians. Iraq offered economic aid of $ 700 million to Cairo for tractors, 
automobiles and engineering industries. Sadat created a number of “free zones”, such as those 
in Alexandria and the Suez Canal Zone, targeting foreign investors. He gave permission to 
foreign banks to operate and promised a five year tax holiday as well as permission to 
repatriate profits and salaries of foreign experts. The USA and their banks signed a number of 
economic agreements, and this new “open door” policy encouraged Japan and West European 
countries to extend loans to the Egyptian government.162 France lifted its arms embargo in 
August 1974, giving Egypt the new possibility to acquire sophisticated French weapons and 
Sadat a bigger range of choices. This brought him the economical and military push he was 
hoping for.  
 
161 Binders, in: The USSR and the Middle East, 1973, page 271. 
 
162 See: Middle East News Agency (MENA), reported by FBIS, November 1974, pp. D-7, D-8, C-4,  
               E-1, in McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 90. 
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Then he renewed his offer from 1970 to the Israeli Government to recognize Israel and to 
come to a peace agreement for land as the first step in his “step-by-step” approach to resolve 
the Egyptian-Israeli dispute. The second step would be the settlement of the Palestinian 
problem, granting allowance for Israel to use the Suez Canal in exchange.  
The Geneva Conference was headed by the Soviet Union and the USA and marks the only 
Russian attempt to take the initiative back from the United States.163 Henry Kissinger 
convinced Golda Meir to come to the Conference on December 21st, 1973, in order to sign an 
agreement of disengagement with Egypt and Syria. Unfortunately, Syria and the PLO did not 
come and the outcome of these agreements included principles of “territories for peace” and 
“peace in stages”. At Geneva, Meir rejected a return to the borders of 1967, but agreed to a 
Jordan-Palestinian state, which should exist side by side with Israel. The bargaining continued 
even after the Rabin government was formed on June 3rd, 1974. However, there was not a 
major shift in the direction of peace but a gradual, slow shift in Israeli public opinion, 
especially on the issue of “territories for peace” and beliefs regarding the readiness of the 
Arabs to reach a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Geneva Conference 
harmed the USSR because Israel, Egypt and the USA used this meeting to enter into a 
possible Egypt-Israeli peace settlement. On March 15th, 1975, Sadat finally canceled the 
Cooperation and Friendship contract with Russia that had been in existence since 1971. The 
Egyptian-Israeli pullback agreement (Sinai I) on January 18th, performed by Kissinger, was a 
great surprise for Moscow. Both countries' troops went back to the other side of the Canal (the 
Purple Line) by March 5th, and by May 31st the UN buffer zone was established, the prisoners-
of-war were exchanged and the UN Disengagement Force, called UNDOF, took up its post in 
the Golan.164 Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” failed at the end, because Sinai II was not 
signed by Syria, the PLO, or the diplomats of the USSR and the USA, but overall, the USA 
was in and Russia was out, as Sadat continued to consult Kissinger. On September 4th, 1975, 
the Sinai II disengagement accord was implemented and Israel removed its forces beyond the 
strategic Sinai passes, restoring Egyptian access to the oilfields in the Suez Gulf. After these 
steps, a new diplomatic calm emerged that forced Sadat to an exceptional, unexpected visit to 
Israel and to hold a speech in front of the Knesset in 1977. 
 
163  See: Mottinger, 1988, page 212. 
 
164 See: Mottinger, 1988, page 122.  
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These two agreements prepared the groundwork for the Camp David Accords of 1978 (13 
days of negotiations between Prime Minister Menachem Begin165 and Sadat in September 
1978).166 On Israel’s side, all these negotiations were greatly influenced by the IDF leadership 
and not signed by the political leaders before the security question was solved. Under these 
circumstances, a demilitarized zone or limited Arab forces in Sinai, the objectives of Egypt’s 
foreign policy after the Yom Kippur War in 1974 seemed to be ready for fulfillment after the 
long quietness of the “no peace, no war” policy: 
1. Returning to Egypt the Sinai Peninsula and other Arab lands (the West Bank of 
Jordan, including the Arab section of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights) under Israeli 
occupation since the June War; 
2. Accelerating the rate of economic and industrial development;  
3. Modernizing political, economic, and social institutions; 
4. Strengthening inter-Arab ties that had recently been forgotten on the basis of political 
consensus and economic cooperation among the Arab states; 
5. Enhancing Egypt’s regional and extra-regional prestige and role in international 
affairs. 
 
This was to be done with the help of the USA and other countries. President Jimmy Carter167 
promised support of 5 billion US Dollar to both Israel and Egypt contingent upon a peace 
agreement at Camp David from 1980 until 1985, including the following details: 
- 1 billion US Dollars for Israel for moving its military bases from Sinai into the Negev. 
Israel had to provide these bases to the US air forces  
 
- 1,5 billion US Dollars for the modernization of the Israeli army within the next three 
years. Egypt received additionally 750 Mio. Dollars every year for covering its budget  
165 Menachem Wolfovich Begin (August 16th, 1913 – March 9th, 1992) was the 8th Prime Minister in Israel and 
the first from the Likud Party. He was born in Poland, escaped the Nazi invasion 1939 and went to USSR. He 
left to Palestine when Germany started his offensive against USSR. He joined the Zionist Underground 
movement Irgun in 1942 and resisted against Britain. Irgun joined the Haganah and Lehi militia. From there he 
fought in the War of Independence against the Arab States. After the war, Begin founded the right-wing party 
Herut and started his political career. In 1973 he formed with General Ariel Sharon and other smaller parties the 
Likud Party. Despite his radical, rough appearance, he signed the peace agreement with Egypt 1979 and received 
the Nobel Prize in 1978 together with Anwar Sadat. 
 
166 See: Ma’oz, 1995, page 132. 
 
167 James Earl Carter (October 1st 1924) was the 39th President of the United States in 1977-1981. 
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- 2,5 billion US\ Dollars would be invested, in Egypt, within the next three years into 
economic- and military projects. In February 1980, it would be lifted to 5 billion 
Dollars and modern combat planes would be delivered168 
 
The peace contract was signed on March 26th in Washington, based on the Camp David 
Accords, and led to the isolation of Egypt by the whole Arab world (except Oman, Somalia 
and Sudan) because Egypt’s peace with Israel was not coherent with the minimal targets of 
the Egyptian foreign policy and the Arab League decided at the Rabat Conference that Egypt 
was expelled from the Arab League. Finally, this agreement not only brought Sadat the Nobel 
Peace Prize, it claimed his life on October 6th, 1981, when a soldier assassinated him during 
the Eighth Anniversary Military Parade remembering the Yom Kippur War. This 
unpredictable outcome had the greatest impact in Israeli foreign policy as a result of the 
situation after the Yom Kippur War.  
168 See: Botor, in: Deutsche Außenpolitik 7/1980, page 83.  
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19  The Palestinian matter 
For the PLO, the Yom Kippur War marks the point of transformation from being a terrorist 
group to being an internationally accepted political representative of the Palestinian people. It 
started with a great concession to change their charter to recognize the existence of a Jewish 
state in 1973. This meant that they would give up the dream of "returning to Haifa," one of 
the main political program points of the Palestinian movement. The Palestinians were not 
directly involved in the war, but with the defeat of the Arab armies, some exiled leaders 
accepted the area of Gaza and the West Bank as a possible territory for the Palestinian people. 
On November 16th, 1973, an article was published in The Times of London by Said 
Hammami, who at that time was the head of the PLO in Great Britain. In this article, he 
accepted the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Israel that would create a Palestinian 
state consisting of Gaza and the West Bank. 
"Such a state would lead to the closing down of the refugee camps, thereby drawing 
out the poison at the heart of the Arab- Israeli enmity." 169   
This article was written after close consultation with other PLO leaders. It offered a new 
political solution that had not been present before the war. Previously, there had been no 
serious discussion about any Palestinian territory and no moderate leaders were in power. The 
PLO and other Palestinian groups avoided making any decisions on that matter. The Soviet 
Union and Egypt pushed for a Palestinian state during the cease-fire talks after the war. A 
precondition for such a state would be an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank. 
Yassir Arafat170 accepted the plan: "… as a first step". The war influenced the PLO so that 
they decided to change from an organization that used terror to reach its aims into an 
organization that was able to look for political solutions through negotiations, since the PLO 
realized that the defeat of Israel was now practically impossible. 
 
 
169  The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1975, page 458.  
170 Yassir Arafat (August 4th, 1929 –November 11th, 2004) was Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) from 1969 until 2004. He became President of the Palestinian National Authority from 
1993 until 2004. He is a controversial figure in modern history: A freedom fighter, terrorist, Nobel Peace Prize 
co-recipient together with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, a corrupt politician, a weak leader (Oslo Accords 
1993), a charismatic leader who unified the Palestinian people, etc. 
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The path to this development was always full of obstacles. The PLO had been created in 1964 
under the protection of Nasser in order to represent Egypt’s policy toward the Palestinian 
people, but it was recognized officially as the representative of all Palestinians by the Arab 
League in 1974, after the Yom Kippur War. How did the PLO remove the Egyptian influence? 
On the other side there was the Palestinian organization PLF (Palestine Liberation Front), 
which represented Syria`s policy. Following the Six Days War, their leader, George Habbash, 
founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Ba’ath established 
the military arm of the Ba’thist Vanguards of the Popular War of Liberation Organization, the 
so called Sa’iqa, which was connected to the Syrian army. Between the June War and the 
Yom Kippur War, Sa’iqa was the most active guerrilla group and became the alternative to 
Fatah. Syria also supported the Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and, in order to make the whole thing even more complicated, the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).  
Eventually, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and Fatah were also receiving payments 
from the Syrians. Because terror was a Syrian policy, every other group was most welcome to 
operate on Syrian territory against Israel and sometimes against Syria’s neighbors. Sa’iqa 
worked to overthrow King Hussein, and in Lebanon, the PLA units were dispatched from 
Syria in 1969 to reinforce the guerrillas in the fighting against the Lebanese. Only at the final 
stage of the Yom Kippur war planning did Asad’s government agree to the quasi-
governmental status of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people. After the Yom 
Kippur War, Arafat, not well-liked by Asad, was the most moderate and influential leader of 
one of the biggest Palestinian groups, was supported from 1976 on by the Sa’iqa and became 
only the representative of the Syrian-Palestinian policy.  
“The crushing defeat of the Arab armies in June 1967, the ‘resignation’ of Shuqairy 
(Ahmed Shuqairy was the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until 
Arafat was elected to the chairman 1968. At the same year Fatah joined the PLO) 
from the PLO, the emergence of more militant and nationalistic leaders within the 
Palestinian resistance movement, and the willingness of other Arab states to support 
rival Palestinian groups changed Egyptian relation with the Palestinians.  
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While the “moderate” leaders of the resistance movement maintained close ties with 
Egypt neither Nasser nor his successor, Sadat, could any longer take for granted an 
automatic Palestinian approval of Egyptian policies affecting their national 
aspirations and goals”.171
After the PLO had become independent from Syrian and Egyptian political influences and had 
gained acceptance by its own people and in the international arena, it could face Israel’s 
policymakers as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian matter. The last country that had 
not cleaned up its relationship with the PLO was Jordan. Not only had the Palestinian groups 
caused a civil war in Jordan, the PLO claims of its own state involved territory that had 
originally been a part of the Hashemite Kingdom. In order to have one voice before the 
Geneva Peace Conference, Asad, Sadat and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia tried to find a 
compromise that allowed speaking on behalf of the Palestinians in front of Israel, USA and 
the USSR. They held a meeting in Cairo in January 1975 to try to resolve the differences 
between Jordan and the PLO, but it was without success. The most successful option was 
introduced by Sadat. He suggested the creation of a confederation between Jordan and the 
Palestinian state after an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. It was rejected 
only by the more militant groups.172
For Israel, there was no reason to change its attitude towards the PLO. Evidence of a minor 
change in the Rabin government in 1974 came from Defense Minister Shimon Peres: 
As far as the Palestinian people are concerned, two other parties are better equipped 
to negotiate: The King of Jordan, and the local leaders of the West Bank.173
Israel’s policy was more to negotiate with an elected representative within the West Bank 
instead of the PLO. However, there were some left-wing politicians at the Foreign Ministry 
and even a number from the right-wing that considered it to be more realistic to deal with the 
PLO as the only Palestinian representative. Such a policy was no longer being considered as 
the Lebanese crises arose and International Arab support diminished. 
 
171 McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 74. 
 
172  See: McLaurin/Mughisuddin/Wagner, 1977, page 79. 
 
173 Interview in: Newsweek, January 14th, 1975, pages 30-31. 
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20  Summary 
The fundament of the Yom Kippur War is the essence of UN Resolution 242, the international 
demand for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed force from the territories occupied in the Six 
Days War. Israel followed the 1967 conflict with the “No peace, No war” policy as a result of 
the Arab League Summit in Khartoum in August 1967 and its “Resolution of the 3 No’s”. 
This Israeli policy and the Arab resolution that describes a deadlocked position of no 
decisions, which was to be to Israel's advantage only. Sadat’s intention after succeeding 
Nasser was to break Israel’s strategy, which had humiliated Egypt and the Arab population in 
that region, by great making concessions to Israel: “Peace for Land” and recognition of 
Israel. Syria followed an opposite policy of terror against Israel. Syria`s President Asad 
differed from Sadat not only in this matter. Asad's regime rejected Resolution 242 and a 
peaceful settlement with Israel. Syria’s decisions were influenced by its ally, the Soviet 
Union. Israel was sure that without Russia and Egypt, Syria would never launch a war, but 
was proved wrong. The Yom Kippur War started on October 6th, 1973. This conflict showed 
the divergence of each of the Arab leaders. Sadat deceived Asad and the Soviets, leading them 
to believe him that he was planning a far deeper advance into Israel’s territory than finally had 
happened at the end.  
Israel’s “No peace, No war” policy was an advantage in economic considerations, but 
otherwise had no political purpose. Prime Minister Golda Meir lost support in the Knesset and 
different point of views of parties and ministers caused a lack of governmental consensus, 
which helped in 1969 to lead to the “War of Attrition” between Israel and Egypt. 
Economically, this “policy of no decisions” was very helpful to Israel because of outside 
financial support, especially from the US, deployment of cheap workers from the occupied 
territories and oil from the Sinai. Golda Meir’s dilemma was a result of the decreasing support 
and growing suspicion of the next generation of voters towards her party, Mapai. Mapai was 
not able to instill their values and ideals in the youth, and lost trust through corruption and 
other oligarchic tendencies of the small elite that ruled.  
After the Yom Kippur War, Israel experienced a strong political and moral defeat and had to 
recognize the Arab countries` new achievements in modern warfare. Its neighbor countries` 
population felt they had recovered their dignity and pride. In Israel people started to shift 
politically, especially to the political right. The changes in public opinion had the greatest and 
most remarkable impacts on the foreign policy of Israel in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur 
War. It was remarkable because it was unpredictable and surprising for all.  
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It is traced by the components of the attraction of consummation, a liberal democratic system 
copied from the USA, the end of the unified era and the beginning of an individual and new, 
egocentric lifestyle. Israel experienced the rise of protest, peace and many other movements in 
the post-Yom Kippur War period. The source of Israel’s new lifestyle, adopted from the US, 
was in no small part the growing dominance of the US in Israel. This dependence is based on 
Israel’s need for advanced weapons technology and financial support. The US is interested 
mainly in oil in the Middle East, and after the Six Days War, Israel became a security 
bridgehead for the US in the region. The US, in return, helped Israel obtain sophisticated 
weapons in order to keep its military superpower status. Since that time, Israel has been in a 
dilemma between its own political interests and the policies of the United States.  
The highest priority of Israel’s foreign policy was and is the Long-Run Survival of the Jewish 
democratic state. This policy is influenced by the decisions of its neighbor and other Arab 
countries in that region (the Khartoum Summit, for example). Furthermore, it leaned on the 
support of the international community, especially the American support, and, as a result of 
the Yom Kippur War, became dominated by the rise of Israeli public opinion. Israel’s parties 
were less influential between the Six Days War and the Yom Kippur War because of the 
dominant position of Mapai, but acted as obstacles in the decision making process. The rise of 
the Israeli public, individual opinions and the overtake of the right-wing Likud party after the 
elections of 1977 made Israel more anti-Arabic, more nationalistic, harder to rule and with a 
more militaristic policy than ever before. This also happened because more high-ranked 
officers took key positions in the country. Without a charismatic leader, Israel’s decision 
makers cannot implement a final settlement unless it has the support of the Israeli public right 
now.  
Israel’s defense doctrine before the Yom Kippur War was based on the misperception that war 
was not imminent because of its military strength. Ben Gurion’s rooted policy of “Land for 
Peace” was rejected by political leaders as well as the enthusiastic public after the astonishing 
victory of the Six Days War because of security reasons and out of the feeling of superiority 
over the Arab countries. This behavior culminated in Israel’s diplomatic isolation and led the 
way from economic growth to inflation. The Yom Kippur War was the result of that 
misperception and destroyed Israel’s myth of invincibility. This misperception was caused by 
the “tunnel” focus of Israel’s defense advisers that took only the capabilities of their enemies, 
not their intentions, into account. To approach Arab motivations from a political point of view 
would perhaps have exposed Arab intentions to go to war.  
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The unlimited trust of the people and the politicians in the army leaders grew out of the 
army's halo of glory from previous wars and their own armistice education. No doubts had 
been raised about them. 
The army in Israel is the melting pot of the nation and the mediator of patriotic and 
nationalistic conviction. Because of this strong position in Israeli society, it has a huge 
influence on Israel’s defense policy. The jump by high ranked officers to high ranked political 
positions (“pyramid hopping”) became a problem in Israel’s governmental structure. The 
dividing line between the military’s influence and political decision-making had gotten out of 
hand since General Moshe Dayan became Minister of Defense. From this time on, officers 
came to cabinet meetings as frequently as the ministers themselves. During the last weeks 
before the Yom Kippur War started, Golda Meir received a lot of warnings but she was 
calmed down by the Israel Intelligence (AMAN) and delayed her decision for full scale 
mobilization. Finally, Gold Meir decided against a preemptive strike and a mobilization 
because she was worried about risking good relations with the USA. These events caused the 
social change and turned the tables concerning Israel’s defense doctrine and foreign policy. 
The basis for that change was the Agranat Commission that had been established shortly after 
the war in order to investigate and to determine the responsibility for the disasters and the 
high casualties of Israeli soldiers. After 140 sessions and testimony from 58 witnesses, the 
Commission on April 1st recommended the dismissal of the IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar, 
Commander of the Southern Front Shmuel Gonen, Chief of Intelligence Eli Zeira and his 
deputy Aryeh Shalev. The head of AMAN for Egypt, Lt. Colonel Bandman, and Lt. Colonel 
Gedelia, Chief of Intelligence of the Southern Command, were transferred to another corps. 
Golda Meir resigned in response to public pressure and made space for Rabin’s government. 
The new governmental and the IDF research traced the problem of its unprepared situation to 
the communication within the army and to its formal and informal channels to the government 
and its policy makers. They decided on frequent ad hoc discussions and meetings between the 
military and political leaderships in the future, which were to provide a direct and steady open 
channel. The intention was to support and influence the policy-decision-making and, as a 
result, the IDF’s influence on daily politics increased enormously. 
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The changes in the internal information channel, the national intelligence, was the splitting of 
AMAN into a new second section, HAMAN, which is responsible for collecting information 
for political decision-makers.  
It was done to avoid receiving early warnings without following proper preparations because 
of interior misperceptions of the enemy's intentions and capabilities.  
Before the Yom Kippur War, Golda Meir, by ignoring the Foreign Ministry, put intelligence 
officers that missed Egypt’s and Syria’s major foreign policy change towards Israel into 
positions of influence.  
Israel’s second foreign policy pillar of survival is its support in the international, diplomatic 
arena, which was always jeopardized by the Arab states. They initiated the diplomatic break 
between the African states and Israel before and during the Yom Kippur War. This is 
considered as a great moral defeat as great as a fundamental loss of support in the UN-
committee for Israel. It caused Israel’s foreign policy shift towards the developing countries 
and resulted in the cancellation of successful development programs in the black African 
states. 
Israel’s connection to European states became the focus of interest after the Yom Kippur War 
when OPEC decided to use oil as a weapon. Suddenly, the European countries were a part of 
the conflict and condemned or punished based on their connection to Israel. The oil crises 
forced European diplomats to think about a new energy policy. Europe’s countries followed 
their own interests and left Israel’s population with the unpleasant reassurance of their “whole 
world is against us” complex. Besides several previous historical reasons, this complex was 
reinforced as this awareness had already emerged during the Yom Kippur War several months 
earlier when West Europe refused to allow American air shipments to stop at their airports.  
Israel counted on the US and its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was interested in leading 
Egypt out of Russian influence. He managed it in a way that avoided the humiliation of Egypt 
by agreeing with Sadat on one common strategy in order to get rid of Soviet pressure and to 
get the US back in. Kissinger pushed out the Soviet Union from the Middle East, received 
Egypt as a new ally and initiated the greatest of Egypt’s and Israel’s policy changes. Sadat, 
supported by the Egyptian public because of his war against Israel, started to open up his 
economy and received financial aid from the rich Arab oil-producing countries as well as Iran, 
Iraq, the USA, Japan and Europe.  
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This new “open door” policy (infitah) did not stop at Israel’s border. After the disengagement 
agreements, the right-wing government under Begin went to Camp David to sign a unilateral 
peace agreement with Egypt in 1978 after Sadat had visited the Knesset to offer peace and 
recognition of Israel in return for land in 1977. Israel’s policy change was already visible at 
the Geneva conference when Golda Meir was ready to agree to a Jordan-Palestinian state next 
to Israel. The major shift was when Israel’s government took Sadat’s renewed offer from 
1970 to resolve the Egyptian-Israeli dispute seriously. The decision to return the Sinai-
peninsula for peace was greatly influenced by IDF leaders. On the other hand, the peace treaty 
with Jordan was advised, because of the water resources, by technicians. The Johnston Plan, 
first rejected by Jordan, finally became the Jordanian point of reference after the Yom Kippur 
War. Rabin offered Wadis and water storage for the winter floods in Israel, encouraged 
building the Maqarin Dam and offered additional water for peace. In 1994 King Hussein 
honored this friendly, open policy with his signature for peace between Jordan and Israel.  
Finally, Syria remained at war with Israel. They reached a disengagement agreement in May 
1974, but they were fighting while their leaders were at the negotiating table. This policy was 
not successful and Syria’s gain from the Yom Kippur War was minimal. With the sole 
exception that the Soviet Union awarded its ally Syria with a higher amount of weapons than 
before the Yom Kippur War, Syria remained isolated. The Palestinian people, a focus of 
Syrian policy, were not involved but influenced by the Yom Kippur War. This defeat of the 
Arab armies provoked the Palestinian exiled leaders to accept Gaza and the West Bank as a 
possible territory for their dream of state. Israel’s policy before the Yom Kippur War was 
denying the existence of a Palestinian nationalistic movement. After this conflict, Israel 
started to prefer to negotiate with elected representatives within the West Bank instead of the 
PLO. The consideration to deal with the PLO as the main representative of the Palestinian 
matter, as was desired by Israeli left-wing politicians, was out of the question after the 
Lebanese crises had arisen. 
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21  Conclusion 
 
Israel’s foreign policy changes are primarily focused on its survival and therefore involved 
different concepts of how to deal with its friends and enemies. Inside and outside influences 
were both affiliated and dropped during its history. 
After Israel had conquered territory during the Six Day War, Ben Gurion’s “land for peace” 
and “population dispersal” (connected to the topic of scarce resources of water and land) 
policy was replaced by a passive one of “No peace-No war”. The Yom Kippur War broke 
with this concept and Israel was left in a process of finding new policies.  
From that point on, others made policy for Israel, namely the US, by Kissinger, and Egypt, by 
Sadat. Israel’s suspicion between the two wars had been changed to the willingness for 
compromise, visible at negotiations between Egypt, Jordan and, later, towards the PLO. The 
Israeli identification crisis was caused by the rise of public pressure within Israel that had to 
be added to the original two governmental considerations of influence: The policy of Israel’s 
enemies and the policy of the international community towards the only representative Jewish 
state.  
In 1974, Israel experienced a shift of its people towards individuality and to the right side of 
the political spectrum. After the 1977 elections, Israel became harder to rule and the unified 
Yishuv era came to an end. New policies were evaluated within the context of different groups 
with divergent interests. 
Concerning Israel’s defense doctrines:  
These decisions were in the hands of the IDF generals and the Minister of Defense. They saw 
their main task in providing security to the state through defense concepts. In 1955, Moshe 
Dayan introduced the doctrine of “force-centered policy of retaliation”. This concept was to 
prevent guerilla- and terror-warfare from coming from the Arab states. It implicates that every 
enemy strike has to cause a strong, immediate Israeli reaction. In the Suez War in 1956 and in 
the Six Days War, the IDF established a policy of “decisive victories”. The Israeli government 
was urged to equip the Israeli army with the best weapons and best trained soldiers possible in 
order to compensate for the numerical imbalance between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the 
case of war. This technical and know-how superiority was intended to deter the Arab leaders 
from waging a war against Israel.  
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It was designed to give Israel the possibility of waging interceptive and preemptive warfare. 
The war itself had to be short (for resource and financial reasons) and effective and leave the 
Arab armies humiliated. Dayan’s and the IDF doctrines were proved wrong by the Yom 
Kippur War, which was started by the Arab armies even though their chances to win were 
very low.  
Nevertheless, after the Yom Kippur War Israel kept the general defense doctrine of superiority 
through high technology weapons and military training, but made some adjustments as 
recommended by the Agranat Commission and searched for shelter from its ally, the US. The 
problem of the great influence of high-ranked military officers on Israel’s defense doctrines 
and policy decisions has not been solved yet. In fact, they have increased.  
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30  Deutsche Inhaltsangabe (Abstract) 
Die Auswirkung des Jom Kippur-Krieges auf die israelische Außenpolitik und 
Verteidigungsdoktrin: 
Die Magisterarbeit behandelt die Frage zu, welchen politischen und 
verteidigungsgrundsätzlichen Veränderungen der Jom Kippur Krieg in Israel führte.  
Der Autor beleuchtet das Fundament, auf dem der Konflikt aufbaut, darunter auch die 
wesentliche UN Resolution 242, die Israel auffordert, die besetzten Gebiete aus dem Sechs-
Tage-Krieg zu verlassen. Der Jom Kippur Krieg war eine Reaktion des ägyptischen 
Präsidenten auf den politischen Stillstands Israels durch die sogenannte „No Peace-No War“ 
Politik, die jene von Ben Gurion, „Land for Peace“, ablöste. Dies wiederum war die Reaktion 
auf die „3 No’s Resolution“ der arabischen Staaten in Khartum nach dem Sechs Tage Krieg. 
Nach dem Jom Kippur Krieg erhob sich das israelische Volk unerwartet gegen die 
herrschende Elite. Der Hauptgrund neben der Individualisierung der Gesellschaft lag in dem 
überstandenen Überraschungsangriff, der ohne Vorwarnung das israelische Volk verlustreich 
traf, obwohl es Hinweise und Anzeichen des nahenden Konflikts davor gegeben hatte. Eine 
der Kernfragen war, warum Premierministerin Golda Meir nach all den internen Warnungen 
die Reserve nicht an die Front sandte. Die daraus folgende Agranat 
Untersuchungskommission gab der militärischen Führung die Hauptschuld, die Regierung 
Golda Meirs trat aufgrund des öffentlichen Drucks zurück und eine Zeit der politischen 
Ohnmacht begann. Als eine der Folgen kam es bei den Wahlen 1977 zu einer Abwendung 
von der traditionellen sozialistischen Partei Mapai hin zu der rechtslastigen Likud.  
Der Autor kommt zum Schluss, dass nach dem Ende des Jom-Kippur-Kriegs die maßgebliche 
Außenpolitik Israels von Amerika und Ägypten geführt wurde, was 1978 zum Frieden 
zwischen Israel und Ägypten führte. Die Einigung über die existenzielle Frage der Aufteilung 
des Wassers in der Region brachte 1994 den Frieden zwischen Jordanien und Israel. Zwischen 
Israel und Syrien besteht bis heute kein Friedensvertrag. Der Grund hierfür wird vom 
Verfasser mit dem Vergleich zwischen der unterschiedlichen Grundsatzpolitik von Ägypten 
und Syrien dokumentiert. 
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Die Erklärung zu dem israelischen Verteidigungsgrundsatz baut der Autor zuerst auf einer 
Abhandlung über den besonderen Charakter dieses demokratischen jüdischen Staates auf:  
Es wurden die Komplexität des israelischen Existenzkampfes, seine Armee, die knappen 
Wasserressourcen in der Region und sein Platz in der internationalen Gemeinschaft erläutert.  
Fazit: Israels Politik und Verteidigungsdoktrin sind an die Politik seiner feindlich gesinnten 
Umgebung an die beschränkte Ressourcen und an die Interessen seiner Schutzmacht USA 
gekoppelt, die dafür sorgt, dass Israel weiterhin die modernsten Waffensysteme, zu 
Verfügung hat. Der Verteidigungsgrundsatz war bis zum Jom Kippur Krieg die Doktrin des 
„Entscheidenden Sieges“ von Verteidigungsminister Moshe Dayan. Dieses Konzept von 1956 
(Suez-Krieg) beruht auf modernsten, hochgerüsteten und gut ausgebildeten Truppen, welche 
die Möglichkeit haben einen effektiven, kurzen Erstschlag auszuführen, um so die numerische 
Unterlegenheit der israelischen Truppen gegenüber den arabischen zu kompensieren; 
gleichzeitig soll es die Feinde vor einem Angriff abschrecken. Diese Doktrin erwies sich im 
Falle des Jom Kippur-Krieg als falsch, da Assad und Sadat ihren Truppen den Marschbefehl 
erteilten, obwohl die arabischen Einheiten in der modernen Kriegsführung technisch und 
ausbildungsmäßig den israelischen Truppen unterlegen waren. Es stellte sich heraus, dass die 
Offiziere, die Zugang in die israelische Politik bekamen, das feindliche Potenzial militärisch 
bewerteten, aber nicht die politische Intention. Der Gegner griff an, obwohl er militärisch 
unterlegen war. Die Agranat Kommission versuchte diesen Fehler im Konzept zu beheben, 
indem sie den Geheimdienst spaltete, um die Kabinettsmitglieder schneller und direkter von 
Vorgängen an den Grenzen zu informieren, aber das grundsätzliche Problem der 
Hauptrekrutierung der politischen Elite aus der militärischen Elite blieb bis heute ungelöst.  
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